

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW




*An American Quarterly
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

OCTOBER

1961

Vol. 20, No. 4

Price \$1.25



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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

Copyright 1961 by the Russian Review, Inc., 235 Baker Library, Hanover, N. H. Published quarterly in January, April, July and October. Second-class postage paid at Hanover, N. H., and at additional mailing offices. Subscription rates: \$5.00 a year in the United States; Canada, \$5.50; foreign, \$6.00; single issues through Vol. 12, \$1.00; subsequent single issues \$1.25. Cumulative Index to Vols. I-XX (Nov. 1941-Nov. 1961), \$2.00 per copy. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

The Russian Review, 1941 - 1961

With this issue *The Russian Review* completes its twentieth year of publication. Through the years it has become increasingly well-known in the United States and abroad as an authoritative organ of information on Russia's past and present. A free forum for scholars and writers, *The Review* has provided a broad survey of the Russian scene, political, historic, economic, and cultural.

To commemorate its twentieth anniversary, *The Review* will publish (in November of this year) a comprehensive cumulative index to the contents of its 20 volumes so far published (price \$2.00). This subject and author index incorporates the subject entries under major topics such as *American-Russian relations*, *Economic history*, *Foreign policy*, *History*, *Intellectual history*, *Literature*, and *Politics and government*. Within such topics further divisions are made into "pre-revolutionary" and "Soviet." This arrangement brings out the broad subject coverage and reflects the many-sided contribution of *The Review* to Russian studies in the United States.

The Editors

The Emancipation of the Serfs in Retrospect

By SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

AHUNDRED years ago Russians of all classes eagerly listened to or read the words of Emperor Alexander II with which this autocratic ruler announced the termination of serfdom and the liberation of about one-third of his subjects from the arbitrary and often cruel power of the landlords. Indeed, this memorable Act of February 19, 1861, gave personal freedom to 23 million serfs, or 34.4 percent of the total population of Russia, promoting them to the status of "free rural inhabitants."

The mere fact that such a tremendous number of people were freed from the control and supervision of the nobility points up the particular importance of this law and made this reform one of the most remarkable events in Russian history. In no other country besides Russia and the United States (which only two years later, on January 1, 1863, likewise liberated the Negroes of this country from slavery) was the liberation of the rural manpower accomplished so swiftly and so radically, by one single legislative enactment. In most lands of Western Europe, as for instance England, France or Italy, the emancipation of the peasantry was a very slow process and its legal enactment often only confirmed the results of long-evident historical trends. Moreover, very rarely did the emancipated serf or slave automatically receive the lands on which he used to work and live. Even in the United States, the slaves liberated by Lincoln's promulgation did not receive the lands they had previously cultivated for the plantation owners.

Certainly it can be argued that in no other land did the emancipation of the rural manpower involve such a considerable part of the population as in Russia, and that Russian reform was therefore bound to be more far-reaching. Since the number of slaves in the United States in the 1860's (some four or four and a half million) was considerably less than the number of Russian serfs, therefore the social implications of the reform were less grave for the nation as a whole than in the land of the Tsar. Still, in the South, where the majority of the Negro slaves was to be found, their proportion was 35-40 percent of the total local population, slightly greater than the corresponding percentage of peasants bound to the nobles in Russia. Throughout the entire territory of the United States, the percentage of Negro slaves in 1862 can be estimated at no less than 15 percent of the total number of inhabitants of this country at that time.¹

Therefore, keeping in mind that the Act of 1861 changed so drastically the legal status and the life of millions of people, it seems rather paradoxical that Russian emancipation became one of the most contested legal and political acts in history. To this day there are debates and discussions among Russian and Western historians as to the importance and consequences of Alexander II's manifesto. It would not be justifiable, however, to accuse the Russian rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of negligence for not having emancipated the serfs. At that time Russian tsars were by no means in a position to do it, for both fiscal and political reasons. The first Romanov was obliged to the nobles for his election to the tsardom. Under Tsar Alexis (1645-1676) the nobles actually participated in the disturbance of 1647 which resulted in the Code of Law of 1649 (*Ulozhenie*) and the final legalization of perpetual serfdom. In the next century the nobles continued to command the destinies

¹*Historical Statistics of the United States*, Washington, D. C., 1960, pp 4-10.

of the Russian rulers, putting four tsars of their choice on the throne and removing three others in 1741, 1762 and 1801, two of these last being killed during palace upheavals. Incidentally, in the dethroning of Paul I a factor of considerable weight was the nobility's indignation at Paul's decrees establishing a legal minimal allotment of land to the serfs by the landlords. Thus this concern of Paul I for the serfs was at least partially responsible for his murder. The end of the liberal policies characteristic of the early years of the reign of Catherine II was also brought about to a large extent by her fear of a new palace upheaval by the aristocratic guards. In view of the influence of the nobility on the throne, it is not astonishing that even the spectacular increase of Russian territory and consequently of arable lands failed to improve the lot of the peasant. Actually, the power of the nobility was not broken until the reign of Nicholas I, who was prompted by the Decembrist uprising to curb the influence of the nobles. Thus Nicholas became the first Tsar of Russia who could have freed the serfs, but even he, being educated in the spirit of eighteenth century absolutism, refrained from carrying out this radical reform, detrimental to the well-being of the nobility.

Still, by the second part of the eighteenth century serfdom had already developed into an unjust and senseless institution. Abolition of compulsory military service for the nobility in 1762 had deprived the serfdom of its only logical foundation. Now the peasant continued to serve the noble, but the noble no longer served the state. Of course, a large proportion of nobles continued their service in the army or administration, but this was no longer a compulsory service remunerated by serf labor, but rather a free choice of a salaried career.

One of the main paradoxes of Russian serfdom was its regional distribution: Serfdom was almost the exclusive and tragic privilege of the Russian peasantry—that is, the peasantry of Great Russia, White Russia, and Little Russia, or the Ukraine.

Among the Finno-Ugric and Turkic nationalities of Siberia and the eastern provinces, serfdom was practically unknown. So, for instance, among the Tartars of the Volga there was hardly more than one percent of serfs.² Among the Bashkirs, Chuvash and Finno-Ugric tribes there were actually no serfs, despite the fact that all of these peoples were incorporated into the Russian state during the era of the rise of serfdom. The Estonians and Latvians were liberated by the Russian government from dependence on the Baltic German Barons in 1816-1819. Among the Jews of southwestern Russia serfdom never existed. The Polish peasants were liberated from serfdom by Napoleon in 1807. It is, however, true that this emancipation deprived them of the lands on which they lived and which they cultivated, and that only in 1846 was their economic condition improved by the so-called "inventory rules," which limited the arbitrary actions of the Polish nobles. These rules also determined, at least partially, the rights and obligations of the peasants of the southwestern region of Russia, present-day western Ukraine. But the remainder of the Russian peasantry, especially the Great and White Russians, continued to live under serfdom. In the provinces of Tula and Smolensk, for instance, seventy percent of the population was comprised of serfs. In the provinces of Kaluga, Nizhni-Novgorod, Vladimir, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Tver and Ryazan the proportion of serfs vacillated from fifty to sixty percent of the total population,³ although it was the same Russian population of these provinces which bore the brunt of the defense and build-up of the empire for centuries. Also very high was the proportion of serfs in the provinces of the Ukraine. From the national viewpoint, a paradoxical phenomenon consisted in the fact that in the Ukrainian provinces west of the Dnieper and in Belorussia, about six million Orthodox Ukrain-

²S. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 15.

³A. Troinitsky, *Krepostnoe naselenie Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1861, pp. 51-86.

ians and Belorussians—who belonged to the “ruling” nationality of the Russian empire—were the serfs of Polish-Catholic landlords, who considered themselves victims of Russian imperialism.

Only by the late 1850's did it become evident to the government that the obsolete social organization of Russia was strongly handicapping the country's political, cultural, and economic growth and even endangering its very existence. The Crimean War of 1854-1856 clearly demonstrated the inefficiency and bankruptcy of the system of serfdom. Only fifty years prior to the Crimean War Russian industry had produced more iron than any other country in the world and the Russian army was better organized and equipped than that of Napoleon; but now, fifty years later, Russian economy and technology had become stagnant, and the industrial revolution, which entirely transformed the life of Western European countries, had hardly affected the land of the tsars. By the time of the Crimean War, Russia, together with Turkey, counted among the economically most backward countries of Europe. Serfdom paralyzed initiative, and was basically responsible for the Russian defeats of 1854-1856 and the considerable social tension which ensued. Alexander II in a speech on March 30, 1856, clearly pointed out that it would be to the interest of the Russian ruling classes to solve the problem of serfdom from above, before the peasants themselves tried to solve it from below.

Realizing that emancipation of the serfs had become inevitable, some ultra-conservatives sought to limit the possible effects of emancipation. They hoped that it would be possible to grant personal freedom to the peasants without giving them any land. Emperor Alexander II was aware, however, that it would be extremely dangerous for the state to transform 23 million serfs into an army of landless and restless rural proletarians. Therefore, the struggle between leaders of the conservative nobility and the liberals became concentrated around the question: how much land should be given to the peasant?

Most of the nobility and especially its petty provincial representatives had very little influence on the Tsar and his policies. But along with these were others who were not numerous and not even necessarily members of the old traditional aristocratic families, but who were rich and close to the throne. According to the data of the tenth census, taken on the eve of the reform of 1861, it is possible to divide the whole body of landlords, of which there were some 103,000, into five major groups:

1. 43,000 had an average of 7.9 male serfs
2. 36,000 had an average of 49.9 " "
3. 20,000 had an average of 197.1 " "
4. 2,500 had an average of 649 " "
5. 1,700 had an average of 2,202 " "

Thus approximately some 99,000 landlords, who belonged to the lesser provincial nobility, had less than 200 male serfs each. In contrast, the last two groups of 4,200 wealthy and very wealthy aristocrats, which accounted together for only 4% of the total number of Russia's landlords, owned 44% of all the serfs or 4.7 million male peasants, the census covering only the male population of the empire. It is natural that from this rather narrow circle of big landlords came the leaders of the reactionary opposition to the reform. They comprised the court of the Tsar, and from their number were usually recruited the higher officers of the guard and the army, the leading administrators and diplomats, the members of the senate and often the upper bureaucracy. Due to their position they were particularly close to the Tsar and exercised considerable influence on government decisions. Minister of the Interior, S. S. Lanskoy, was well informed when he reported to Alexander II that "it is particularly sad that the main opponents to the desire of Your Majesty belong to the circle which is particularly close to the throne . . . The discontent of the landlords is quite understandable. It is hard for them to give up their planters' privileges;

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 53-111.

being ashamed, however, to admit it, they attempt to explain their feelings as those of purely political opposition."⁵

Lanskoy was certainly justified in expressing his apprehensions. The strongest voices against the reform came exactly from these upper four thousand, who were so well represented at the court. These voices claimed primarily to be inspired by their concern over the future of the country, rather than by embitterment at the prospect of giving up their hold over a part of their immense estates and thousands and thousands of peasants. "Finis Russiae," they would say, "the time of Pugachev once more is not far away . . . The folk change very little . . . The speeches of the peasants are gloomy . . . It is nothing other than the roots of a new Pugachev's rebellion . . . People say that in Penza the peasants are excited to the extreme and that the slightest pretext would suffice for them to start a massacre . . ."⁶

These quotations, taken from the letters of Russian nobles written on the eve of the reform, reflect their thoughts and fears. Many of them felt that the emancipation should be postponed. "Before we begin with emancipation, we must first combat alcoholism among them and educate them," claimed some of them. Still others feared that emancipation would result in an economic catastrophe for the nobility, and they tried to sell their estates in order to invest their money in industrial enterprises in Russia and abroad. A Russian aristocrat living in France informed a friend that according to his information, in the first four months of 1857 alone over forty million rubles were transferred by his noble countrymen from Russia to foreign countries. Many others, fearing revolts by their serfs, preferred to go abroad. "There are so many Russians abroad," wrote Count N. Tolstoy in a letter, "that one must undertake foreign travel in order to see one's friends."⁷

⁵*Russkaya starina*, 1899, VI, 106, 111.

⁶*Ibid.* 1897, XI, 237 and 1898, I, 84, 80-81.

⁷*Ibid.* 1897, X, 25, 32, 33 and 1898, I, 80-81.

This conservative group of courtiers and wealthy landlords, a part of whom, fearing peasant disturbances, transferred their fortunes to France, Germany and England or took up residence in Paris and in German spas, finally succeeded in partially limiting the reform. At their insistence many ultra-conservatives were included in the committees set up to prepare the emancipation laws. The most influential among these reactionary bureaucrats and nobles were Prince B. Golitsyn, Prince P. Paskevich, Count V. Apraksin, and Count P. Shuvalov, as well as some representatives of the Polish magnates in Lithuania and Belorussia.

Fortunately there were among the Russian statesmen not only representatives of the reaction. Among the closest relatives of the Emperor were two staunch supporters of the liberation of the serfs—his brother, Grand Duke Constantine, and his aunt, Grand Duchess Helen. Also, many influential statesmen pointed to the inevitability of the reform, such as the Minister of the Interior, S. S. Lanskoy, Prince V. A. Cherkassky, Yurii Samarin, and the actual head of the supporters of emancipation in the secret committee, General J. Rostovtsev.

The struggle between the liberals and the reactionaries in the secret committee on the peasant reforms became reflected in the compromise formulation of the final emancipation enactment. The serfs received personal freedom. The government also decided that they should "basically" receive the lands which they were cultivating for their own purposes. The landlords were supposed to keep the lands which together with the income and crops from them, they traditionally called their own, despite the fact that these lands were also cultivated by the serfs. However, having taken as the basis for the division of land between serfs and landholders the actual use of the fields in 1861, the committee carried through a considerable number of stipulations to the benefit of the nobility. The committee considered that, in view of the loss of the non-paid labor force, the govern-

ment should try to alleviate the economic situation of the landlord. Alexander II pointed out in speeches of September 4, 1857, and January 28, 1861, that he wanted to limit the losses and sacrifices of the nobility. The landlords were thus allowed the right to keep, in certain circumstances, up to one-half of the peasant's allotment provided that the peasant would be granted at least "the legal minimum of land." This "legal minimum" varied according to the soil and the economic conditions of the particular province. Moreover, the peasants had to pay the government for what land they did receive according to the law, while the government compensated the landlord directly for the price of the peasants' land.

Especially detrimental to the economic well-being of the peasants was the provision of the so-called "grant allotments." According to this provision the landlord and the peasant could "voluntarily" agree on a special grant allotment, considerably smaller than the average normal allotment decreed by law, but for which the peasant had to pay nothing. About half a million peasants, tempted by the prospect of debt-free land, concluded such agreements with the landlords and received lots which were hardly sufficient for their barest subsistence.

In view of often inexact and conflicting statistical data, it is not easy for a contemporary Western scholar to determine the exact extent of losses suffered by peasants during the reform. In any case, the available data do not confirm the tendentious claims of vociferous nineteenth-century leftist journalists and of some contemporary historians. Indeed, some of them, on the basis of the data from 27 selected provinces, insist that the peasants lost as much as 16 percent of their acreage.⁸ Professor G. T. Robinson, on the other hand, believes that these losses were of some 1.4 million *desiatins*,⁹ or only 1.2 percent.¹⁰ Perhaps more

⁸M. Nechkina, (Ed.) *Istoria SSSR*, Moscow, 1949, II, 442.

⁹1 desiatina—2.7 acres.

¹⁰G. T. Robinson, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime*, New York, 1949, pp. 87, 268.

accurate is the data supplied by the Soviet historian S. Yushkov, who maintains that the reform cost the peasantry 5.2 million desiatins or 4.5 percent of their total pre-reform landholdings.¹¹ Unfortunately, the recent and most authoritative Soviet investigator of the reform, P. A. Zaionchkovsky, shuns any exact conclusions, preferring to claim that even before the reform many landlords had appropriated substantial parts of the fields of their serfs.¹²

Equally unclear is the picture of the financial aspect of the reform, and particularly of the exact value of the land received by the peasants. A. E. Lossitsky, the oft-quoted authority in this field, considered that the former serfs overpaid for their masters' allotments about 219 million rubles, the official redemption price being 38.4 percent above the average market price at the time.¹³ Certainly it is possible that this average price of 27 rubles per desiatina, or \$5 per acre of cultivated land, paid by the peasants to their former masters was really beyond the actual price before the reform. Still, keeping in mind that land value rose sharply in the following years and some forty or forty-five years later skyrocketed fourfold to 103-116 rubles¹⁴ for unimproved peasant land, it may be admitted that the prices paid were from the standpoint of money investment not too high, and that in any case the peasants could not lose money selling their allotments.

A study of the changes in the Russian rural landholdings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a large extent equally refutes the well-known assumptions of the Russian radical writers that the nobles' landholdings actually dominated the picture of the pre-revolutionary countryside. After the re-

¹¹S. Yushkov, *Istoria gosudarstva i prava SSSR*, Moscow, 1950, I, 548.

¹²P. Zaionchkovsky, *Provedenie v zhizn khrestianskoi reformy*, Moscow, 1958, p. 301 ff.

¹³A. Lossitsky, *Vykupnaya operatsiya*, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 16-19.

¹⁴P. Khromov, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitiye Rossii XIX-XX vv.*, Moscow, 1950, p. 401.

form of 1861, former serfs, "state" peasants, and the Cossacks became either collective or individual owners of 121.9 million desiatins, while in the hands of the nobility remained 73.2 millions.¹⁵ After that time the acreage of the estates of the nobility rapidly dwindled, dropping in 1905 to 52 million desiatins and in 1914 down to 39.5 million. Correspondingly, peasant and Cossack land tenure rose in 1905 to 153 million desiatins and in 1914 to 170. Adding to these 170 million desiatins some 21 million desiatins which were in the possession of Russian and native peasants of Asiatic Russia, it would seem reasonable to state that with its 190 million desiatins, peasant land tenure surpassed that of the nobility almost five times.¹⁶ It may be added that along with the peasantry and the nobility there was appearing a rapidly growing "third estate" consisting of the urban and rural capitalist or collective landowners, whose property by 1914 accounted for no less than 31 million desiatins. Hence, on the eve of World War I the Russian nobility owned hardly more than 15 percent of 263 million desiatins in private or communal ownership (not including the lands owned by the state and crown). In his writings Stalin indirectly admitted this fact when he indicated that in the pre-revolutionary era only 12 percent of the grain crops were harvested on the estates of the landlords.¹⁷

The loss by the nobility of 10 million desiatins in the years 1907-1914 clearly proved the rapid decline of "noble" landholdings in the land of the tsars. The continuation of this process was unavoidable in view of heavy mortgages and the deplorable financial situation of a great part of the estates. On the other hand, it is true that a certain number of wealthy aristocrats managed to strengthen their economic position by turning their lands into prosperous agricultural enterprises of the capi-

¹⁵Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 268; Khromov, p. 408; P. Liashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR*, Moscow, 1948, II, 525.

¹⁷I. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Moscow, 1950, XI, 85.

talist type. By 1900 about 23 percent of all acreage in the hands of the nobility and about one-quarter of the entire income from agricultural enterprises were concentrated in some 700 mammoth economies of this dynamic capitalist type, which were owned by some two or three hundred very wealthy families.¹⁸ Together with these, the estates of non-noble agricultural capitalists also flourished, such as those of the Ukrainian sugar-barons Tereshchenko and Kharitonenko, owners of dozens of large sugar beet plantations and sugar refineries. On the lower Dnieper and along the Black Sea were located 200,000 desiatins of farms and ranches owned by one Falz-Fein. In the Urals, especially in some districts of the Perm province, many lumber and mining "empires" averaged up to 280,000 desiatins (about 750,000 acres).¹⁹ On the other hand, many estates of nobles were hardly more than glorified farms. In some districts of Poltava, Chernigov, Minsk, Kovno, and other southern and western provinces the average size of a landlord's "estate" was around a hundred desiatins, often smaller than the farm of a prosperous and enterprising peasant.²⁰ The total number of such "pocket-size" noble landowners and their slightly bigger neighbors was about 44,000-45,000 in 1900, but this number was steadily diminishing.

Despite all its shortcomings, the peasant reform of 1861 did not perpetuate the domination of rural Russia by the nobility, nor did it deprive the peasants of the opportunity for growth and development. Indeed the Russian allotment was not very large, and considerably smaller than an average American farm, but the Russian peasant's landholding was nevertheless rather substantial compared with peasant landholdings in Western Europe. In France, for instance, three-quarters of all landholdings were less than five acres or 2 desiatins, while the average size

¹⁸A. Finn-Enotaevsky, *Sovremennoe khozyaistvo Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 493.

¹⁹Zaionchkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-439; Liashchenko II, 480; *Ukazatel fabrik i zavodov Evropeiskoi Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 682-689.

²⁰Zaionchkovsky, pp. 433-439.

was 9 acres or 3.5 desiatins.²¹ In pre-revolutionary European Russia still only 15.7 percent of the peasants owned 4.0 desiatins (10.8 acres) or less; 73.8 percent of them had from 4.1 to 20 desiatins (10.9 to 54 acres) while the remaining 10.5 percent of rich peasants had over 20 desiatins (54 acres).²² These data, currently used by historians and economists, cover *only* the land held in communal tenure. The average size of the peasant holdings, including not only communal but also *privately owned lands*, was in 1914 slightly over 14.0 desiatins (37.8 acres) for European Russia, and considerably higher for Siberia.²³ But the Russian peasant did not know how to produce as much as the Western European farmer, nor was he acquainted with modern market agriculture. A considerable number of peasants remained poor even in the early twentieth century, and many of them joined the restless army of dissatisfied and hungry rural proletarians. The primitive methods of cultivation, lack of means for land reclamation, the absence of machinery, and unimproved seeds and stock were primarily responsible for the peasants' low standard of living. The frustrating system of Russian communal land tenure further handicapped development of initiative and progress in the Russian village. While there was always a plentitude of advice at hand on how to seize the estates of the nobles, unfortunately for the Russian peasant too few of his advisers were concerned with helping him improve his methods of cultivation. However, after the abortive revolution of 1905 and Stolypin's reforms, many peasants liberated from the compulsion of village community bonds, altered their ways of farming. The spectacular rise of crops in European Russia alone from 13.6 billion puds in 1896-1900 to 18.5 billion

²¹Robinson, p. 97.

²²Liashchenko, II, 272.

²³In European Russia some 11-12 million peasant families owned over 170 million desiatins both in private and communal ownership. As far as communal land tenure is concerned the average allotment in 1905 was 11.1 desiatins (Khromov, p. 395).

puds for the five years 1909-1913 clearly demonstrates the technological and economic changes in the Russian village.²⁴ Historians like to consider Stolypin's reform a failure, pointing out that *only* one-fifth (actually just 24 percent) of all the peasant households preferred to change their communal landholdings to individual ones. It may be argued, however, that, on the contrary, it was remarkable that as *many* as this number of households were able to decide to change their traditional method of landownership during the short seven-year period when this agrarian reform was sponsored by the government.

There is little doubt that the consistent and total implementation of Stolypin's reform might have meant a harsh lot for many poor and landless Russian peasants and even their eventual displacement from the village into the city, where they would have been forced to join the mass of industrial workers. Such, for instance, was the fate of most English peasants, and much of the peasantry of Germany and France. But the final carrying through of collectivization likewise resulted in a forced abandonment of the rural countryside by millions of peasants. Instead of 150 million peasants, there are now in the Soviet Union only some 65 million *kolkhozniks*. In this respect the difference between the possible effects of Stolypin's laws and Stalin's collectivism consists primarily in the fact that Stolypin wagered on the wealthy, and wanted to leave in the village the successful and enterprising peasants, while Stalin drove these from the countryside, leaving the leadership in agricultural activities to the poorer, insulted and injured peasants, who unfortunately often happened also to be the less successful and least enterprising. The effect of the mentality and traditions of this new agrarian leadership can still be felt in Soviet agriculture, if its recurrent difficulties and crises can be taken as an indication.

²⁴To these 18.5 billion puds harvested in European Russia should be added some 5.5 billion puds harvested in the same years, 1909-1913, in Siberia (Khromov, p. 408). Thus the average annual harvest in the last five pre-World War years was in the entire empire some 4.8 billion puds against 3 billion puds in the 1890's.

*War Comes to Russia - in - Exile**

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

IT is hard for those who have never been uprooted to understand the misery of the political émigré's estate. "If a tooth could feel after being knocked out," Gorky wrote from lovely Capri, "it would probably feel as lonely as I . . ." In defeat or isolated flight, with no prospect but the continuing night of exile, there is only the dubious sustenance of the closed-in colony of lonely, high-minded, self-righteous, warring handfuls. Lenin's personal letters are full of expressions of distaste for the controversy, recrimination, intrigue, and schism of which he was perhaps the greatest master. "Emigrant life is now a hundred times more difficult than it was before the Revolution of 1905," he wrote to Gorky after his flight from Russia in 1907. His letters to his mother are full of inquiries about the snows, the festive holidays, and the coming of the Spring on his native Volga.

The émigré colony, most numerous in Paris before the War, as again after 1917, were, we must remember, the irreconcilables, voluntary and involuntary revolutionary exiles from their native land because of principle. Not for that was the deprivation any less deep: separation from family, friends, country, from immersion in native language, intercourse, feelings, culture, scenes, from all the familiar round of activities that go with belonging to some land's daily life. The very principles which raise the refugee in his own eyes above the ordinary citizen serve also to deprive him of organic relation either to the land of his longing or the land of his refuge, contracting his life to something less than the ordinary citizen's estate.

*This is a chapter from the author's forthcoming book entitled *The Conquest of Power: The History of an Idea in Action*.

To a writer who has been forced to flee abroad every Russian word is sacred, for his roots may wither for lack of feeding from the springs and elements of his native soil. The political émigrés were most of them in some measure intellectuals, too, coming from that intelligentsia which tried to live by ideas alone. Whether declassed intellectuals or declassed workers, their means of making a living in their new home that was not home were mean and marginal, which made their unsatisfied longing for their native land the more intense. Now war came, catching up everybody around them, giving every man a place for weal or woe in the community of his nation. What were these irreconcilables to do in this hour? They had declared war to the death on tsar and regime. Many had escaped from hard labor, from Siberian outposts or administrative exile in the frozen north. Some had broken out of jail, fled from prison terms, or from death sentences. Among the Anarchists and Socialist Revolutionaries, some had been involved in attempts on the lives of tsarist officials. Yet their war to the death was now submerged in universal war.

"The worker has no country," they had repeated, but nostalgia for their native land took possession of them all the same. They became aware of love of their own people as never before and of solidarity with their nation in its hour of danger, a feeling to which they had believed themselves immune. Those who had been abroad longer had had time to mingle with love for their lost home a love for their second home, France, where they had learned to know freedom as something more than a sacred word.

Yesterday their war had been with each other. They did not intend it that way, for they had a common enemy, the Government in St. Petersburg. But that enemy was out of reach, so they had turned on each other, accusing each other of "objectively" strengthening the enemy by advocating the "wrong" methods of fighting him. So it had been yesterday. But today

a wholly new division cut across the hitherto warring groups, a new division and a new solidarity that broke up all the old factions, reducing them to a shambles overnight.

A. A. Argunov, Socialist Revolutionary leader writes:

The Paris Center of the Socialist Revolutionary Party was turned by the outbreak of war into a smashed ant heap, with the ants running off in all directions biting at each other as they ran.¹

The biting was between those who wished to defend Russia, or France, and those who held to the old "internationalist" formula. The rift cut across all tendencies and shadings, yet it did not bring solidarity to the "internationalists." These continued their faction wars and tactical controversies as before, adding new ones on the proper tactics toward the war. But it brought the "defencists" of all socialist groups into close comradeship.

Lydia Krestovskaya, who has written the best account of the movement of the Russian émigrés to volunteer for the French Army, tells of the torment these dedicated Russians went through as they tried to reconcile lifelong anti-war positions with the moods welling up within them:

... the drama of people who had no land of their own when the land which has given them shelter finds itself in danger ... How react to the events? What to do? Each felt that silence was a crime, that life demanded an immediate answer.²

Many signed up to dig trenches, strengthen the fortifications of Paris with fresh masonry and earth, produce shells in ammu-

¹A. A. Argunov, *Pravoe i levoe*, an unpublished manuscript quoted by Oliver S. Radkey in his *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism*, New York, 1958, p. 88.

²Lydia Krestovskaya, *Iz istorii russkogo volunteerskogo dvizheniya vo Frantsii*, Paris, N. D., p. 10. This 145-page pamphlet is a compendium of documents, excerpts from the author's diary, bearing dates in 1914, letters with dates in 1915 and 1916, actual political documents with their dates, and again letters, reflections and diary excerpts dated in 1917, 1919, and one in 1920, after which the pamphlet unaccountably returns to matters of 1914. This chaotic organization gives all the items the strong flavor of contemporaneity in which there has been no retouching. Other matter pertaining to the present article is to be found on pages 11-12, 43-45, and 121-122.

nition factories. Women, too, entered into the munition works. "But the basic question remained: *volunteering*." For more than two weeks a debate raged in all party centers, in cafés until closing time, then in lodgings, or, where landlords protested about the noise, in the streets.

People fought furiously with each other, with hatred, and from the first day there arose two hostile currents, cutting short at one stroke relationships that had been created over years . . . Some plunged into an activity of silent thought and reexamination of all the commandments which had been till now the basis of their entire view of life . . . N. V. Sapozhkov (the top Bolshevik Paris leader) for two whole days and nights lay alone in bed, refusing to get up, to answer questions, to say a word, while he appraised and weighed *pro* and *contra*. Then he arose and said simply to his intimates: "I am going to volunteer!" Neither questions nor appeals could draw from him a word of explanation or of argument.³

Sent to the front at once, Sapozhkov fought recklessly and gallantly, volunteering for all dangerous reconnaissance missions. That same autumn, going out on a detail of six and sensing danger ahead, he bade the others stay back while he crawled forward . . . to his death. The pro-war socialists did not last as long as the antis, so that in time death greatly reduced their earlier numerical superiority.

After two furious weeks of debate around the clock, more than 9,000 Russian émigrés (not counting those who had gone into labor battalions and munitions factories), singing Russian and French revolutionary songs, marched to the Recruiting Bureau in the Maison des Invalides. Next day, about 4,000 of these were found fit for active service—the test of fitness being not too exacting—and, after a week or two of training in camps, were dispatched to the front. They were a motley army, consisting, Krestovskaya writes, of "journalists, writers, artists, craftsmen, clowns and antique dealers," and, she forgets to add, professors, doctors, lawyers, hereditary nobles, and members of all the variegated nationalities that made up the Russian land. "Naturally, at their head had to be that vanguard of the Russian volunteer

³*Ibid.* p. 11.

movement from which now there remains but a handful . . . scattered over the world."⁴

The "vanguard" to which she refers, a strange parody of Lenin's vanguard yet the same breed of men, the "most conscious revolutionary elements," were not content merely to enlist. They formed a "Russian Republican Detachment." Thus they could demonstrate that they were serving Russia but not the autocracy, and defending in France the idea of the republic and of the French Revolution. Was not Germany, like Russia, an empire headed by a semi-absolutist monarchy? So the first 4,000 found in the Republican Detachment its conscience and its leadership, "the spiritual and ideological vanguard of the Russian volunteer movement in Paris."

The Republican Detachment was indeed composed of men accustomed to lead the émigré colony, some seventy-five to eighty party activists drawn from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries. At the head of this little band marched S. N. Sletov, one of the founders and top leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and N. V. Saposhkov (Kuznetsov), who since 1910 had been secretary of the official Bolshevik Committee supposed to direct not only the Paris Bolsheviks but all Bolshevik organizations abroad.⁵

⁴*Ibid.* p. 11.

⁵A note in Vol. XVIII of the Third Edition of Lenin's works, p. 426, gives the number making up the Republican Detachment as 80. Krestovskaya's account, written earlier, records the names of 74 but is incomplete. Of these she lists 21 as already having been killed in action, 13 wounded, 4 deserters, and 12 as *ref.*, an abbreviation which is most likely a transcription into Russian of the French word for being returned to the ranks after having been wounded. On the fate of 22 she could get no information, and she records that one is in Russia and two are prisoners of war. The Socialist Revolutionary leader, Argunov, in an unpublished manuscript cited by Radkey (*The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism*, p. 119 n.) gives a list of 68 of these Republican volunteers. He numbers 35 as Social Democrats, without distinction between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, 17 as Socialist Revolutionaries, 9 as Anarchists, and 7 as undetermined. Krestovskaya's breakdown according to national origin gives 26 Russians, 38 Jews, 4 Georgians, 2 Poles, the rest scattered or unknown. Argunov's figures are 33 Jews, 29 Russians, and 6 of other communities.

Until August 1914, the humane temper of Russian Populism as contrasted with Russian Marxism had expressed itself inside the SR Party in the friendly spirit, so rare among Russian intellectuals, with which they differed with each other, and the tolerance which their various groupings and tendencies showed towards each other within the same organization. Left and right, terrorists and peaceful enlighteners, had followed a voluntary division of labor, disagreeing without rancor, conducting their debates without the endless splits, personal attacks, and bitter feuds which characterized the Social Democratic or "Marxist" faction wars.

Now war engendered a more exacerbated rift than the SR's had ever known before. The émigré leaders, out of old habit, were still able to hold a unified conference at Beaugy-sur-Clarnes, Switzerland, on August 22, 1914. But the debate there became sharp and bitter between "defencists" and "internationalists." For the first time the idea of "betrayal," so readily used by Lenin, was hesitantly voiced in an SR conference. The sword drew a line between them: they began to think of each other as " betrayers of the International" or " betrayers of Russia." The word *traitor*, once it rises to the lips, no longer permits of comradeship. Tolerance was stretched beyond the breaking point, with consequences that would become apparent in 1917.

At the Conference, the pro-war or "defencist" elements were in a majority. Three founders of the party were present. One, Victor Chernov, declared himself an internationalist. A second, Chernov's brother-in-law, S. N. Sletov,⁶ proclaimed that he was enlisting for the defense of French democracy. The third founder, A. A. Argunov, declared for the defense both of France and Russia. To them rallied such outstanding spokesmen of the SR's as N. D. Avksentiev, Ilya I. Bunakov (Fondaminsky), V. V. Rudnev, who in 1917 would become Mayor of Moscow, Boris

⁶When Sletov was killed in action, Chernov stirred up great bitterness at his funeral by lamenting that his brother-in-law had died under the tricolor instead of the red flag.

Savinkov, a leader and ideologist of the terror, I. A. Rubanovich, the party's representative in the International Socialist Bureau. On the other side with Chernov stood Mark Natanson (Bobrov), venerable link with nineteenth-century Populism, and three lesser figures, B. D. Kamkov (Katz), Dalin (M. A. Levenson) and Peter Alexandrovich (Dmitrievsky) later to serve in the Soviet Cheka. In 1917, this little band would split again, Natanson, Kamkov and Alexandrovich breaking with Chernov in favor of a line which would for a while resemble Lenin's. Down in the ranks of the SR party in 1914, the pro-war sentiment was still stronger than in the leadership.⁷

Perhaps the Populist sensitivity to the uniqueness of their native land, its history and its institutions, and their devotion to the *narod* (which in Russian means both "the people" and "the nation") made their love of country especially strong. But the other groups of "irreconcilable" émigrés seem to have been no less vulnerable to the unacknowledged feeling of love of country.

Of the four founders of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Deutsch and Zasulich, only Axelrod took an "internationalist" stand. Plekhanov became the chief spokesman for the idea of volunteering. Only his age and poor health prevented him from doing so himself. He made the farewell speech in honor of the Republican Detachment of socialist volunteers who were enlisting in the French Army. To Deputy Buryanov, his closest follower in the Duma, he wrote:

It would be most distressing if our fellow-thinkers should hinder the cause of the self-defense of the Russian people by any thoughtless step. A vote against the credits would be a betrayal of the people, abstention would be cowardice. Vote *for!*

Among the Menshevik leadership, as among the SR leaders, the proportion of "internationalists" was somewhat higher than among the rank and file. Martov and Alexrod led the internationalist remnant abroad, while in Russia six of the seven Menshevik Duma Deputies kept the banner of "international-

⁷Radkey, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV.

ism" flying. But Dan, himself an "internationalist," writes in his history of those years:

Among the Russian socialist émigrés in foreign lands, especially in the lands of the *Entente*, the great majority stood under the influence of the ideology of 'the Defense of the Fatherland.'⁸

Lenin would have loved to gloat at this "treason" of SR's and Menshevik Social Democrats. However, the news of his own faction, slowly coming to him from Paris, gave him pause.

Though in practice Lenin held all the threads of command in his hands and picked the members of the various committees, the official center supposed to direct the Bolshevik émigrés was located not in Cracow but in Paris. Its Secretary was N. V. Saposhkov, whose reactions Krestovskaya has already described for us. He was an old Bolshevik who so much enjoyed Lenin's confidence that he had been a delegate to the London Congress of 1907, and had been named Secretary of the Paris Center in 1910, while Lenin still lived in Paris. In the last days of July he tried frantically to get in touch with Lenin, but the telegraph office refused to accept a wire addressed to Cracow, in Austrian Poland, for Austria-Hungary was already at war. Sapozhkov then sent telegrams to Bolsheviks in neutral Switzerland, begging them to get in touch with Lenin or Krupskaya and communicate Lenin's instructions to Paris. These messages, too, remained unanswered. Once France was invaded, Sapozhkov, as we know, refused to meet with his Committee, say a word to any of his comrades, or even explain the process by which he had arrived at his decision to volunteer.

As unemployment hit all but the war industries, everyone was, for the moment, free from morning until night to discuss the war. Here is a description of the discussion among the Bolsheviks by one who took part in it:

On August 1 a poster was put up announcing mobilization.

⁸Plekhanov's letter to Buryanov is cited in Yaroslavsky, *Ocherki po istorii V.K.P. (b)*, Moscow, 1937, p. 248. The Dan quotation is from his *Geschichte der Russischen Sozialdemokratie* (continuation of a work carried by Martov up to 1908), Berlin, 1926, p. 275.

The café overflowed with emotion.

To accept or not to accept the war?

Acceptance found more supporters. Immediately and fatally arose the question of volunteering . . .

In the little restaurant on the rue des Cordelières, almost all the members of the group were present. On the order of business, only one question: volunteering. The meeting is disorderly, the discussion anarchic, passions high. The meeting breaks up in general tumult . . . Partisans and adversaries of volunteering exchange brutal words. At last the group of "defencists" marches demonstratively out of the meeting. Some one cries after them: *Renegades!* But the cry finds no echo, nor much sympathy either . . .

. . . On the Place des Invalides, where volunteers were being accepted, the first groups of Russians applied. They were, for the moment, separate individuals. But in a few days the movement took on a more organized character. In the rue de la Reine-Blanche, near the Avenue des Gobelins, in the poor meeting hall of the Workers' Club of which Antonov-Ovseenko was the Secretary, there begins, under his direction, the enrollment of émigré volunteers. Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SR's, Anarchists enroll there. In a few days the first Russian Republican regiment was constituted, into which entered the following members of the Bolshevik group: Sapozhkov, Antonov-Popov, Mikhail Davidov, Ilya Japaridze (Moiseev), and others. On their initiative there was drawn up the declaration that, now that war was here, it was necessary to face it and decide, as Marx and Engels had, the question of the victory of which side would be of most advantage to democracy and socialism.⁹ The war was caused by the aggressive imperialism of Austria and Germany. These two lands had always been the bulwark of the Russian autocracy. The victory of feudal Austro-German militarism over the democratic powers of Western Europe would fatally strengthen international militarism and reaction . . . arrest social evolution in Europe . . . strengthen autocracy and backwardness in Russia. But the defeat of the German and Austrian ruling classes would bring not only

⁹Cf. Lenin's favoring of the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. *Collected Works*, 4th Russian Edition, Vol. VII, p. 183; VIII, pp. 31-39, 239, 448-51. The key quotation reads: "The proletariat . . . does not forget, however, not for a moment . . . that while class rule remains it is not possible to evaluate wars from only a democratic sentimental point of view, but in every war between exploiting nations it is necessary to distinguish the role of the progressive and reactionary bourgeoisies of one or another nation." In a number of the other passages indicated he makes clear that in this war the Japanese bourgeoisie is the progressive side and its victory desirable both from a Russian proletarian and an international proletarian point of view.

a republic and socialism to Germany and Austria, but, by removing the last supports of tsarist reaction, in Russia as well . . . The signers of the Manifesto are profoundly convinced that we serve faithfully the interests of the international proletariat. They are entering the armies of Republican France under the slogans: Long live democracy! Long live the German Republic! Down with Tsarism! Long live German socialism!¹⁰

Thus Bolshevik activists supplied not only the recruiting agent, Antonov-Ovseenko, and the recruiting center, their workers' hall, but the Manifesto by which SR's, Anarchists, and Mensheviks as well as Bolsheviks justified their volunteering. From other sources we learn that the author of the document was the Bolshevik Mukhin, who used the *nom de guerre*, Ekk.¹¹ Alexinsky, who had been Lenin's chief spokesman in the Second Duma but had later gotten into conflict with him on tactical matters and joined the Left or Vperyodist Bolsheviks, became the editor of a pro-war Russian social-democratic paper, *Rossia i svoboda* (*Russia and Freedom*), to which Plekhanov became the most authoritative contributor. In September this group of Bolsheviks and former "Party Mensheviks," (as Plekhanov had called his group) came to an agreement with Avksentiev, Bunkov, Voronov, and Argunov of the pro-war SR's to merge their paper into a joint organ of all defencist socialists to be called *Prizyv* (a Russian word which can mean either a call or a call-up for military service). Thus, at long last, did Plekhanov begin to reverse the split between Marxists and Populists which he himself had initiated back in 1883.¹²

¹⁰Aline (Alin). *Lénine à Paris*, cited in Rosmer, *Le mouvement ouvrier pendant la guerre*, Paris, 1956, pp. 466-68. The text of the Manifesto of the Republican Volunteers is given in French in Rosmer, pp. 468-69, and in Russian in Krestovskaya, pp. 123-24. It is characteristic of Bolshevik activism that Lenin's group provided both the recruiting agent, Antonov-Ovseenko, and the ideologist, Mukhin, who drafted the Manifesto for signature by Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and SR's. And it was Plekhanov, waverer between Bolshevism and Menshevism from 1903 to 1914, who delivered the solemn farewell address.

¹¹The Manifesto, dated August 21, 1914, was issued over the signatures of a committee of two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, and one SR.

¹²For *Rossiya i svoboda* and *Prizyv*, see Dan, *op. cit.*, p. 275. Radkey reproduces many SR writings from *Prizyv*.

The Bolshevik Leading Committee of Organizations Abroad fell to pieces. Two of its five members volunteered for the French Army (Antonov-Britman and Sapozhkov), a third resigned both from the Committee and the Party, leaving two badly confused and demoralized members to wait for some word from Lenin. How many Bolsheviks volunteered is uncertain. Aline, who was there at the time, says that a majority were in favor of volunteering. Krupskaya in her memoirs writes a little gingerly:

In our groups abroad . . . there was not such firmness . . . The problem was unclear for many . . . In Paris in the end (*v kontse kontsov*, i.e., in the long run) a majority of the group came out against the war and volunteering, but a part of the comrades—Sapozhkov (Kuznetsov), Kazakov (Britman, Sviyagin), Misha Edisherov (Davydov), Moiseev (Ilya, Zefir) and others—entered as volunteers into the French army.¹³

Since some of the pro-war Bolsheviks like Antonov-Ovseenko, after acting as recruiting agent for the Republican Volunteers, later became anti-war under the influence of Trotsky, and since some of those who "did not declare themselves" in favor of volunteering were by age, sex, or condition of health prevented, it is not unlikely that Krupskaya's "minority" and Aline's "majority" represent substantially the same picture.

Among the Bolsheviks who did enlist immediately, we know that Japaridze was wounded, Kazakov, Sapozhkov, and Davydov killed in action, and only the fate of Mukhinov (Ekk) among

¹³For the disintegration of the Bolshevik Center in Paris, see Lenin, 3rd Edition, p. 426; Krupskaya, *Vospominaniya o Lenine*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 230-31. For a Bolshevik account written nine years after the events, which gives the number of Bolsheviks who volunteered for the French Army as 11 out of a membership of 94, see I. P. Khonyavko, "V podpolie i v emigratsii," in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 4, 1923, p. 168. The picture of what happened to the Bolshevik movement inside Russia is less clear, except for the equivocal stand of the Duma Deputies, and their overseer, Kamenev. But we know that a number of outstanding Bolsheviks were pro-war (see below, note 14), and that even such an old Bolshevik as Voroshilov, with seven years of prison and exile behind him, volunteered for the Tsar's army. (Erich Wollenberg, *Ostprobleme*, July 21, 1951, p. 895.

the leading Bolsheviks was unknown when Krestovskaya compiled her list of the "Russian Republicans." Krupskaya continues even more circumspectly: "In other groups also (i.e., other émigré centers) the question was not clarified to the end."

"Not clarified to the end" is a rather remarkable understatement, for the number of outstanding Bolshevik intellectuals both in exile and inside Russia who rallied to the defense of their country was truly astonishing. Among them were the two translators of *Das Kapital* into Russian, I. I. Skvortsev-Stepanov and V. A. Bazarov (Rudnev); the Bolshevik leader in the Second Duma, Alexinsky, who founded his pro-war journal in Paris; the Bolshevik writer and editor, A. A. Troyanovsky; the Central Committee Member I. P. Meshkovsky (Goldenberg); Lenin's earliest comrade-in-arms and intimate, Krzhizhanovsky; the bomb-maker, fund-raiser, and troika member of 1905, Krassin, and lesser journalists and propagandists like Finn-Yenotaevsky, chronicler of the revolutions of 1917. To be sure, Lenin had already written off Bazarov and Alexinsky, when he quarreled with the former on philosophy and the latter on tactics, and both of them had joined in the formation of the "left" Bolshevik *Vpered* Group which Lenin read out of the Party in 1912. But Skvortsev-Stepanov was an esteemed contemporary, born like Vladimir Ilyich in 1870, a veteran of the revolutionary movement, which he joined in 1891, a historian and economist of some reputation, the translator of a number of Marx's works, the author of studies on the Paris Commune and the French Revolution, a four-volume textbook on political economy and a volume on "Historical Materialism and Natural Science." Lenin had regarded him as so dependable that he had chosen him to represent the Bolsheviks at the Stockholm "United" Party Congress, and as a Duma candidate for Moscow. Moreover, he had spent eight years in jail which proved him a "rockhard." Meshkovsky-Goldenberg, too, had been a man to rely on: a Bolshevik member of the "united" Central Com-

mittee from 1907-09, representative of the Committee to the Third Duma Fraction, a delegate with Lenin to the Stuttgart Congress of the Socialist International.

They were "traitors" during the war, but when Skvortsev-Stepanov returned to the fold in 1917, Lenin named him Commissar of Finance in the first Soviet Government, assigned him to make two provocative addresses to the Constituent Assembly just before it was dispersed, and entrusted him with many other important tasks. In 1922, Skvortsev wrote on the project closest to Lenin's heart, "The Electrification of the RFSFR," and Lenin wrote an introduction. Leonid Krassin would become Lenin's Commissar of Trade and chief negotiator of economic accords.

So, too, did Meshkovsky-Goldenberg rejoin the Bolsheviks after 1917, and receive assignments involving confidence in his ability and probity. The case of Troyanovsky was more complicated. A Bolshevik from 1904 on, he had been one of Bolshevikism's important journalists, writing for and serving on the staff of *Zvezda*, *Prosveshchenie* and *Pravda*. To Gorky Lenin wrote in 1913, "Troyanovsky and his wife are good people . . . Everything we know of them till now speaks in their favor. And they have means. They might be able to return [to Russia] and do a lot for the journal." Troyanovsky was close enough to Lenin then to prepare the materials on which Malinovsky and Lenin based their argument to justify the split of the socialist Duma Delegation. But Troyanovsky became an ardent defendant, eloquently appealing to Russian socialists to defend their country. His return to Bolshevikism was difficult and circuitous: a Menshevik in Russia from 1917 to 1921; then a Bolshevik once more in 1923, after which he was entrusted with the ambassadorships to England and the United States.¹⁴

¹⁴The biographical details of the lives of Skvortsev, Meshkovsky and Troyanovsky are taken mainly from the biographical notes to the Third Edition of Lenin's works. The letter to Gorky is in *Lenin i Gorkii, Pisma etc.*, Moscow, 1958, p. 93.

This is not the place to discuss the reaction to the war of Bolshevik leaders inside Russia, but one interesting case worth considering in this context is that of Leonid Borisovich Krassin. Krassin had been one of Lenin's big three in the stormiest and most critical years: the year 1905 with its efforts at armed uprising, and the years 1906 and 1907 when the secret *troika*, Lenin, Bogdanov, Krassin, directed the revolutionary holdups or "expropriations." During those days, Krassin was Lenin's chief source of funds. He it was who lined up his employer, the wealthy Morozov, Maxim Gorky, and others to contribute. As an engineer with considerable technical ability and a conspirator whose skill in that difficult art aroused Lenin's admiration, Krassin managed to retain respectability as a manager and director of electrical enterprises while he manufactured bombs for both Bolshevik and Maximalist terror attempts. The year 1914 found him in Russia as the Manager-Director of the Petersburg Branch of the Siemens Schueckert Elektrische Gesellschaft. His wife in her biography of her husband tells how he was filled with gloomy fears for the future of Russia when Germany attacked. He felt restless and disturbed because he could not figure out how he could be useful in Russia's defense.

In time, however, he found scope for his energies in organizing a number of war hospitals out of funds provided by the concerns of which he was managing director . . . Under his able direction, our little relief organization made great strides. An opportunity came in 1915 for Krassin to do some work of real national importance . . . An effort had to be made to mobilize the trading resources of the country . . . Krassin was chiefly instrumental in establishing this organization on a working basis under the title of the War Industries Committee.¹⁵

Once an activist, always an activist. For Russia now as once for Lenin, he raised funds, recruited industrialists and workingmen for the war effort, worked day and night without rest to bring into being the War Industries Committee, which com-

¹⁵Lubov Krassin, *Leonid Krassin: His Life and Work*, London, 1929, pp. 21-22.

mittee Lenin attacked most bitterly as representing a betrayal of the cause of revolution, class struggle and socialism. But this "treason" did not hinder Lenin from enlisting Krassin's energies and commercial and technological skills to negotiate peace and trade agreements, to run the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, to represent the Soviet government at Genoa, Rapallo, the Hague, and London. Could it be that Lenin did not really mean the word *traitor* as other men do? Or that treason no longer mattered in those who could be useful again, and who, in the latest separation between sheep and goats, had returned to the side of the sheep in the fold?

Thus the internationalist socialist and the internationalist workingman, like the cosmopolitan man of the eighteenth century, and like Marx's "international bourgeoisie," had shown after all that he was really the Englishman, the German, the Frenchman, and the Russian.

Lenin might charge, as he found it politic to do, that all parties had wavered and betrayed "except the Bolsheviks." Yet he could not help but know that his "rockhard Bolsheviks," gathered painfully one by one over the years, selected for their energy, their firmness, their orthodoxy, their hardness, their agreement with "the correct line," had wavered and "betrayed" like the others. And that the masses had been caught up by the enthusiasm and fevers of war as much as—nay, more unreservedly than the leaders.

In the last month of his political life, a few days before a stroke stilled his tongue and pen forever, he wearily acknowledged what in his heart he had known all along:

It must be explained to the people how great is the secrecy with which war arises, and how helpless are the ordinary organizations of the workers, even those calling themselves revolutionary, in the face of a really oncoming war.

It is necessary to explain to people with all concreteness again and again how matters stood at the time of the last war, and why it cannot be otherwise.

It is necessary to explain, especially, the significance of those

circumstances which make it inevitable that the question of "the defense of the fatherland" will be decided inevitably by the overwhelming majority of the workers in favor of their own bourgeoisie.¹⁶

But in 1914, in an Austrian prison, then on the road to neutral Switzerland, Lenin was able to force this awareness out of his consciousness. He turned the matter over and over as he elaborated his own *sui generis* position on the war. Had the war come "with great secrecy" or had it been cynically and openly plotted for years? Why, cynically and openly plotted for years, of course, for this made the guilt of ruling classes and socialist leaders the graver. Had the masses reacted as patriots, sometimes carrying with them, sometimes silencing, their leaders? No, the leaders had betrayed the masses, and now the leaders and organizations which had committed treason had to be destroyed and the masses redeemed from their Judas-leaders. Had there been a strong strain of patriot and *defender of the Fatherland-in-danger* in Marx and Engels? But this war was not the one they had foreseen but a different one. Their choice of "*victory for which side will be more advantageous for progress?*" was applicable only to their time, not to this different age. (For the first time Lenin permitted himself to be a "revisionist" ready to declare that some basic approach of Marx and Engels was outdated.) Had the German Social Democracy, which he had admired above all others for its organization methods, its power, and its orthodoxy shocked him into disbelief,¹⁷ grieved and outraged him as nothing else had ever grieved and outraged him? Then he would declare that he had seen it degenerating for years, that its treason was the worst, and the pacifist apostasy of its theoretical spokesman, Kautsky, the "most dangerous of all."

¹⁶"Notes on the Question of the Tasks of Our Delegation to the Hague," written Dec. 4, 1922, Lenin, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 409-10.

¹⁷At first, according to Zinoviev and other memorialists, Lenin thought that the issue of *Vorwaerts* announcing the voting of war credits by the Social Democratic Deputies was a forgery of the German General Staff.

Some of these thoughts a close disciple might conceivably have anticipated, yet as he turned things over and over in his mind, while in prison and in flight, he would devise a position which not even those closest to him would be prepared for. The stand he proclaimed in his *Seven Theses on the War*,¹⁸ would be foreseen by no one and, for a long time, be shared by almost no one. It would draw a line not only between him and the pro-war elements inside his group and outside of it: it would draw a line between him and the *anti-war* elements. It would divide, as with a sword, Lenin from all other anti-war and internationalist tendencies. It would separate him from the internationalists, Martov and Axelrod and Chernov. It would draw a line between him and Rosa Luxemburg and between him and Trotsky.

Thus in August and September 1914, Lenin alone knew what "the Bolshevik" stand was to be. Fleeing with Zinoviev and Krupskaya from Austria to Switzerland, Lenin "carried with him about all that was left of the Bolshevik organization abroad,"¹⁹ together with the ideological basis on which it was to be reconstituted. In his head were the shibboleths which were to divide yesterday's Bolsheviks from today's, divide Bolsheviks from non-Bolsheviks, Leninists from would-be Leninists, Left Zimmerwaldists from Zimmerwaldists, and even one little group of Left Zimmerwaldists from another.

Had Austria kept him in jail, where they at first put him, and held him incommunicado as an "enemy alien," until the war's end in November, 1918, how different would everything have been, at Zimmerwald and Kienthal, in the International, in Russia in 1917. History is full of such *ifs* and *almosts*, for what is *ex post facto* proclaimed to have been "inevitable" is only what has happened. Having irrevocably happened, it acquires its appearance of having been inevitable all along.

¹⁸See *Three Who Made a Revolution*, Chap. XXXVI, "Seven Theses Against War."

¹⁹Gankin and Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War*, Stanford, Calif., 1940.

From Switzerland Lenin began anew, as he had done so many times before, to pick "Leninists" one by one, gathering them around his new platform. *His* new platform, from which he would not deviate, nor add one thought of another, nor compromise a single expression. "Never, it seems, was Vladimir Ilyich in such an irreconcilable mood . . . There were differences with Rosa Luxemburg, Radek, the Dutch [left], with Bukharin, Pyatakov, in part with Kollontai."²⁰ As so many times before, he would pick out one by one the individuals who accepted his line from the first word to the last and followed him unconditionally. He was too selfless, or too unconscious of self, to say "Leninist," but now, as in the past, wherever Lenin and two or three were gathered together, there was Bolshevism. "Bolshevism" was not what that handful might vote it to be, but what Lenin laid down, for he would select them, not they him, working out his position first, then selecting them one by one by the infallible test that they approved "the only correct position" as he had formulated it.

Who could believe then that this man, starting once more from scratch to pick adherents, would in three years be ruler of a great land? Certainly, Lenin could not believe it, for as late as January 22, 1917, he told an audience at the Zurich People's House: "We old ones perhaps will not live to see the decisive struggles of this coming revolution."²¹

If in 1914, Lenin stood all alone, Nicholas II seemed more secure than any Tsar since Alexander I defied Napoleon in 1812, for in this hour of Russia's danger, the workers ceased their strikes and marched to the Winter Palace to sing *God Save the Tsar*, while the irreconcilable battalions of the enemies in foreign lands disintegrated, or rallied to the defense of the Fatherland, or of its ally, Republican France.

²⁰Krupskaya, pp. 264 and 271.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 271.

Pavel Florensky - Priest, Scientist, and Mystic

By LEONID SABANEEFF

FLORENSKY was one of those persons in my life who made the deepest impression on me, owing to the intensity and profundity of his intellect, which amounted to unquestionable genius despite his propensity to paradox and contradictions. He was a man quite unlike any other. "A clever and cruel monastery priest"—thus one who had been closest to him described him later, in exile. And he would add: "There was something creepy about him." I should put it more exactly: "something awesomely creepy," demoniac or diabolical, and yet holy. It is difficult to put this impression into words.

I had known him for a long time, ever since we were undergraduates together in the mathematics department of the Moscow University. He was older and a year ahead of me. He rarely attended lectures (like most senior students, who preferred to read books on their subjects at home). He seemed oddly old for his age. I remember something said about him at that time (the end of last century) by the extremely gifted Rafail Soloviev (nephew of Vladimir Soloviev), who died young: "He looks as if he had already lived a thousand lives."

Florensky's appearance was strange, strikingly unusual: oriental features, oddly spare movements, eyes that avoided looking at you, always cast down, looking inwards, contemplative. It always seemed to me that he was himself apprehensive of the bane-ful effect of his glance. Maybe it was due to his indubitable asceticism and the habit of concentration, of looking at his own thought rather than at his interlocutor.

From him emanated clearly perceptible vapors of a highly complex nature: one had an impression of genius, of unusual depth and power of thought, and at the same time there was something of black magic, dark, devoid of divine grace. I remember what Professor Luzhin, a faculty colleague of mine, once told me about him, a strange story about three of his "spiritual disciples" whom he was training in "spiritual asceticism": All three committed suicide.

I felt that Florensky possessed immense spiritual experience and was endowed with hypnotic power. His own asceticism was beyond doubt. It was manifest that he had undergone a complete and thorough training in "religious intellectual practice," possibly following the Russian Orthodox monastic tradition, but more probably also in other ways. He regarded himself as Orthodox, but to me his views always appeared much broader than the dogma of Orthodoxy.

His erudition was vast. He held degrees from two university departments (philological and mathematical) as well as from a theological academy. He was a philosopher, theologian, historian, mathematician, physicist, but he apparently took little interest in the biological sciences and none whatever in sociology. He lived in his own closed, ascetic, intensely intellectual world and in the world of his secret "spiritual exercises." He never talked about it, and when I questioned him he would give some evasive answer or none at all. Yet I had good reason to assume that he at times engaged in Yogic exercises and was well acquainted with Hindu mysticism. In his tastes and psychological attitudes he seemed close to the early medieval gnostics (Origen, Basilides, and others), much closer probably than to pure and naive Orthodoxy.

His mind was complex, many-storied, and to some extent even hostile to simplicity. One might even call it a cabalistic mind, though he had no Jewish blood, but apparently some Armenian or Persian. Certainly there was something "Asiatic" in his re-

sponse to the world. His extravagant and excessively luxuriant thoughts often contradicted one another, but this did not embarrass him in the least. He often spoke of the "many facets" of any true thought and of the compatibility of contradictions on the deepest level. He even asserted that every perceived law "generates" its own negation, inasmuch as every law discerned by the logical apparatus of man is but a part of a real, comprehensive synthetic law embracing "all that exists" and "all that is possible and thinkable." Logic is valid for the "earthly life," for the lower levels; but the true world is one where contradictions are compatible—a realm of antinomies. He obviously regarded antinomy as the basic law of the universe, encompassing all others.

Florensky was rather short, swarthy, with a long nose, a slight stoop; he spoke in a husky voice with a slight stammer; he was not eloquent but took pains to express himself with the utmost precision—the heritage of mathematical discipline. Outside his chosen sphere, science and mysticism, he generally talked very little and would keep silent for long periods. I do not remember ever having talked with him about an everyday matter. His conversation was always significant, often fraught with deep meaning. He was completely devoid of any drawing-room manner and affectation, unlike Viacheslav Ivanov, for example, who esteemed him highly but was rather worldly and smooth-spoken himself.

It was Ivanov, by the way, who brought me and Florensky closer together. After our graduation from the University we had somehow drifted apart. Florensky no longer lived in Moscow and stayed most of the time at the Troitse-Sergievsky monastery. Yet it was during these very years (the beginning of this century) that I myself was engrossed in the study of mystical doctrines from a scholarly point of view. Ivanov brought about a renewal of our friendship by introducing Florensky into the world of the composer Scriabin, to which he was close and in

which I was completely immersed myself. Florensky, however, did not fit into Scriabin's set. He was too far removed from music and from art in general. Moreover, it was all too clear, to me at least, that the rather fashionable atmosphere of the Scriabin milieu was not congenial to him, for Florensky's intellectual level and psychological "tonality" were superior and more complex by far. Still, he evinced some interest in Scriabin's concept of "mysteries," although, to my mind, it was hardly compatible with his own views and his whole personality. But then, as has been mentioned, Florensky's own utterances did not always chime with each other, which he considered rather an asset than a defect. I remember how at the funeral service for Scriabin he came up to me and said in his husky "otherworldly" voice that he felt that Scriabin's "mystery," despite his death, might still be realized, but only after thirty-three years. I did not forget this number. But in 1926 I left Russia forever and lost all contact with Florensky. All the more interested I was to learn from an outsider, also by then an émigré, that exactly thirty-three years after Scriabin's death, in 1948, Florensky himself had died, probably in a concentration camp in Siberia (previously he had been deported to the Solovetsky monastery). The "mystery" had been consummated—not for Scriabin but for Florensky himself. He seems to have had some kind of foreboding.

It so happened that most of our talks took place during the era of Lenin's NEP. Florensky was still a priest, but without a parish, without intercourse with believers. The atmosphere of the Soviet regime, at that time fiercely anti-religious and generally opposed to mysticism and philosophy, was antagonistic to him. However, in his talks with me (and presumably with others) he never touched on topics of a "social" nature. I know nothing of his political views. The Bolsheviks had deprived him of his office and his chair at the Theological Academy, but he accepted the situation with serenity. He took off his cassock, wore civilian clothes, and supported himself by giving lessons

in mathematics and working at the electro-technical department of the "Glavelectro" (he was a good physicist). He seemed to look upon the Bolsheviks from some mystical height, as a necessary link in the historical process.

In those years many were afraid to meet him because, as a former priest and a mystic to boot, he did not stand well with the authorities. He would call on me often but irregularly and always without warning. At that time there were few people left in the U. S. S. R. with whom he could converse about lofty subjects. As for me, I enjoyed playing the part of his "victim," since his conversation was always highly meaningful, often so paradoxical as to verge on the fantastic, yet withal intellectually inspired. By then I had familiarized myself with his fundamental opus, *The Pillar and Foundation of Truth*, 1914, (*Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny*), which once had earned him the degree of doctor of theology, and was able to appreciate this immense work, a remarkable compendium of knowledge, wisdom, profundity, intellectual imagination, all this now and then forming a dense mass of allegory, symbolism, and analogies. It contained philology and philosophy, mysticism of every brand, mathematics, physics, as well as theology in the narrow sense. The style came closest to that of the cabalists (symbolism of numbers, allegorical method of thought). I was struck by one observation: everything in his masterwork that touched upon knowledge, thought, comprehension of the universe, was on the level of genius; but whenever he attempted to deal with the leitmotif of the Christian religion, symbolized in the image of the "heart," he sounded flat and unconvincing, even lapsing into a kind of cloying sweetness, utterly alien to his psychological type. His innermost, intimate religion was closer to a synthesis of all great world religions than to the Orthodox faith. By nature he was an occultist and was possessed rather by the spirit of cognition on a grand scale than by that of kindness and charity; Lucifer was

closer to him than Christ. This increased rather than diminished his fascination for me.

In my last, and to me most memorable, talks with Florensky—already against the background of the Russian Revolution—we hardly ever discussed any problems of theology proper, or even his monumental work, *The Pillar and Foundation of Truth*, partly because my approach to religion was more scholarly than theological. Mostly he talked about his cosmic ideas and fantasies, which he set forth with great animation, at times ecstatically. They were often so bold and challenging that I consider it my duty as a scholar to transmit them to posterity.

In respect to his ideas about the structure of the universe it is interesting to note that while in the theological sphere he was rather an archaist, a man of the early Middle Ages and the gnostic era, in the field of science he was a "modernist" eagerly watching the progress of his favorite sciences, mathematics and physics. His cosmic theories, like all his ideas, were always keenly paradoxical; but they were subject to change, depending both on his whim and on the quick pace of evolution in these scientific fields.

He began by acquainting me with the conception of the structure of the cosmos he had developed in his pre-Bolshevik period. In this sphere he was utterly free of his usual theological and mystical preoccupations: one sensed his desire to reconcile science and revealed truth. His initial theory of the structure of the universe centered in the idea that "there are no stars," that the stars are actually *optical replicas of the sun*, for the reason that light rays, in his opinion, cannot be exactly rectilinear. Not being rectilinear, they must, when returning to the earth, produce images of the sun on a diminished scale—i.e., the stars. The "sizes" of the stars, according to this theory, correspond to the cycles of the revolution of a curvilinear light ray issuing from the sun. The most ancient cycles form agglomerations of stars such as the Milky Way, which actually is nothing but the sun itself.

From the very first this hypothesis seemed to me devoid of solid foundation, yet it was novel and interesting, and in a scientific sense no less, and perhaps more, revolutionary than the Copernican system once was with regard to the Ptolemaic cosmogony. It was marked by a paradoxical freshness of thought and a thrilling audacity. He did not go into details, nor did he submit his theory to a test; he was interested only in launching a general synthesizing idea (an attitude contrary to that of Newton, who avoided setting up hypotheses). Here was pure speculation, a pure hypothesis without preliminary experiments and measurements. He did not "degrade thought by experiment."

After the appearance early in this century of Einstein's postulate about the relativity of time, and as Florensky's scope expanded to include the new theories of the structure of space known as the non-Euclidian geometries (those of Lobachevsky, Riemann, and others), he developed and modernized his cosmic theory. Yet in essence the revised theory remained the same and preserved the idea of a "single sun" and its "optical scattering" in the guise of the stars. But the "curvature of the light ray" due to various causes as it travels through billions of light years (a curvature that is more than just probable, according to Florensky himself) was replaced by the assumption that straight lines within "curved spaces" are apt to curve *of themselves*. Florensky gave preference to Riemann's "spherical" space over Lobachevsky's "pseudo-spherical" one; in the *finite* spherical space the closed straight lines of light rays would necessarily produce the same optical effect—the "multiplication of the sun" in the form of a multitude of its optical reflections, the stars. Moreover, beyond the boundaries of Riemann's spherical space—where we have, only mathematically, "virtual" points and a virtual area of space—Florensky desired to locate "the empyrean world of divine entities" (here spoke the theologian). He arrived in another way also at the assumption of this "virtual empyrean world," mathematically expressed by what is known as

"complex numbers." Michelson's famous experiment, the starting-point and source of Einstein's theory, had been a notorious failure: the light rays were found to be insensitive to the relative movement of the earth, regardless of whether or not this movement coincided with the direction of the rays or went in the opposite direction. From this empirical fact Florensky drew the logical conclusion that "the earth does not move at all," and that the Ptolemaic "geocentric" system is closer to truth than the Copernican "heliocentric" one. Actually, of course, the matter was not so categorically simple as that; and I am even inclined to believe that Einstein himself, fascinated by the paradoxical character of his theory, had been too rash with his conclusions, the artist in him, at this point, prevailing over the scientist. As for Florensky, the idea of an immobile earth had a special attraction for him, for he saw it as a confirmation of the truth of the Biblical tradition. Here the theologian and archaist came to the fore, albeit operating with the most modern tools. If the earth is immobile and the sun revolves around it, then the fixed stars removed from us millions of light years must move with even more incredible speed than the sun. Yet according to Einstein's theory, velocities greater than that of light do not exist and are impossible in nature. Consequently, here once again we reach the region sought and longed for by Florensky—that of the "virtual mathematical spaces"—and he was not long in locating here "the empyrean world and the heavenly hosts," upon which he had set his heart.

In this reasoning Florensky reveals his medieval mentality and cabalistic turn of mind—the cult of the number, the belief in the sacred meaning of numbers ("numbers rule the world")—as well as his hieratic attitude towards mathematics and his profound conception of it as a *sacred* science, the most fantastic and creative of sciences, the most independent of experience, autonomous, generating its own separate world, possessing its own logic, broader than the ordinary scientific logic and dominating it.

Contradictions did not dismay him, for he professed that the "whole" truth has many facets and necessarily contains its own antinomy. His dream was to create a system of metalogic having about the same relation to ordinary logic as non-Euclidian to Euclidian geometry. He even claimed to have drafted a detailed outline of such a metalogic based on the negation of certain logical axioms (the method of Lobachevsky and Riemann) which formed the basis of the Aristotelian logic.

According to my notes, my intimate and highly saturated talks with Florensky were not very numerous—about thirty-five in all, taking a total of about a hundred hours. It is difficult to remember all the themes discussed in the course of these conversations to which I ascribed then, and still do, an exceptional value, for myself as well as for history and science. I did not keep minutes of our talks so as not to inhibit the free flow of his thoughts and the flight of his imagination, for he was secretive and, strange as it may seem, rather diffident: he would suddenly fall silent if he sensed some subtle change in the atmosphere or in his interlocutor. I tried, therefore, to commit everything he said to memory and used to jot down a short résumé after every session: although my memory at that time was exceptionally exact, I could not be sure that it would always remain such. I was aware, moreover, that Florensky's position in the U. S. S. R. was very insecure and that, deprived as he was of the opportunity to publish anything or even to do any scientific work, he was hardly in a position to keep any notes of his ideas himself. It is unlikely (although I do not know it for sure) that any manuscripts of his have been preserved after his death, besides those published before the Revolution. I do not know the date of his deportation and have no information about the entire period of his life from 1926 up to his death in 1948. But surely in his place of deportation he was free only to think his thoughts, not to write them down nor, of course, to have them published.

I was far from being always in agreement with his theories and scientific fantasies. Mostly these were intellectual improvisations unsupported by any kind of experiment, not even by spiritual experience. Yet despite the wide divergence in our scientific methods I was always under the spell of this powerful flow of profound and unusual ideas, especially when they related to fields of knowledge in which I was then, and still am, engrossed.

An excellent mathematician who concentrated his attention primarily on the latest trends in mathematics, he expressed time and again the idea that mathematics was broader and more comprehensive than the human mind. Mathematics, according to him, "is *more intelligent* than the human brain; it leads man farther ahead into regions inaccessible to the brain and not corroborated by sensual images." It was clear to me that mathematics was his guide even in the area of mystic speculations: it helped him not only through the elementary language of numbers (as in the case of many earlier mystics) but by means of the whole panoply of the modern mathematical apparatus: analysis, the theory of sets, and all the latest theories on the boundary between physics and mathematics.

It seems to me that the dominant motif of his life was the idea of the alliance and fusion of science and revelation, the termination of the antagonism between these two spheres that had developed in the course of the historical process. Hence, perhaps, the occasional confusion of his methods: in the field of science he would think, to some extent, in religious terms (intuition, prescience, intellectual revelation, the tendency to transgress boundaries), while in religion he would often reason in terms of science and apply to it purely scientific methods.

His inspiration could be stirred by some insignificant stimulus. I remember a few such sudden unfoldings of the intellectual imagination—explosions, as it were, of intellectual energy. Once the subject came up of time as the fourth dimension of

the universe. A chance remark about this was sufficient to make Florensky burst out with a veritable poem on time. Here is a brief summary of the ideas to which he then gave expression.

Time for him was something considerably more complex than it is usually assumed to be. Time, he said, did not present itself to him as a single dimension, as a "line of time" such as it is generally imagined (even in Einstein's theory). *Time has many dimensions.* The actual universe cannot and ought not be limited by any *number*, inasmuch as the series of numbers is infinite and in modern science is further complemented by the categories of new number sets (irrational numbers, "virtual numbers" of various orders). If there exists one dimension, then there may be two, and many, and an infinite number. If there exist "virtual numbers" and virtual points, then there must also be virtual moments and virtual areas of time. The number of space dimensions is neither three nor four but infinite; and this complex of spaces can include three-dimensional and even two-dimensional ones; and all Euclidian, as well as non-Euclidian, spaces may be its component parts. The same goes for the sense organs: there are by no means only five of them, or any other finite number; there is an infinity, but for a given "psychological atom" at any given moment of any one time only a few are available. There *must* exist a world with different psychological and physical properties, a world lying in other spaces and moving in different times.

Time, he went on, besides not having a finite number of dimensions, must be "ramified"; there exists not one future but an *infinity of various future moments*, of which at every given moment only one is experienced, because the limited human psyche is incapable of encompassing in its consciousness the immense multitude of moments of different dimensions and all the ramifications of the future. Moreover, time, like space, can be not only straight but also curved (Einstein's time is curved). It can be infinite, but it can also be closed (analogous to a

closed line. The concept of a single future is nothing but a *theory of predestination*. Furthermore, at every moment, the future divides itself into a multitude (infinity) of actual new futures. The "closed" time, after having run its cycle, "returns" and is inevitably drawn into the "sphere of eternal repetition," into a vicious circle, which he was inclined to identify with the idea of "hell" in religion. He thought that God did not create the world in time at all; this is even logically impossible since the act of creation already requires time, two moments of time: the moment without creation and the moment of creation. God has always (outside of time) coexisted and formed a whole with the universe and with time—more exactly, with the infinity of various times and spaces, physical and psychological. In contrast with the concept of "eternal repetition," linked for him with the idea of "hell," the prison of the spirit, the religious concept of "paradise" and "eternal bliss" he definitely connected with the idea of the "abolition of time." He imagined paradise as independent of time, as existence in "timelessness."

The "divine entities" demanded by his mystique he regarded as inhabitants of other times and other spaces which only on rare occasions intersect our ordinary world and space. Such intersections are not easy of realization, which explains their comparative rarity. Occasionally, as I have mentioned, he would assign these entities to "virtual spaces and times," whose actual existence he considered not only possible but inevitable. As for the psychological world of living creatures (human beings, animals, plants, and even minerals) he regarded it as a separate many-dimensional world entirely independent of other worlds, yet maintaining a constant, though only partial, connection with them and capable under certain conditions of achieving contact with them, even without the intermediary of the organs of the senses.

Once he mentioned the possibility of man's experiencing exceptional states of awareness, in particular "the acceleration

of time." He hinted at instances of a flash-like "perception of the sum total of the past" and of "states of cosmic consciousness." Since he spoke about this quite positively and with utter simplicity as of something in no way supernatural, I gathered that he had experienced such states of consciousness himself, although he never said so outright. As I knew him, he was utterly incapable of exaggeration or myth-making in that particular sphere, still less of untruthfulness; he just was not that kind of person. I assumed that he had travelled a long road of spiritual growth and trial, that he had graduated from the "mystical academy"—surely not only the Orthodox one. I strongly suspect that he had gone through Hindu stages of Yoga and was somehow linked with the remnants of gnostic and cabalistic wisdom. Certainly his appearance was peculiarly appropriate for this. However, I must admit that he never spoke of this and avoided discussing such topics, possibly because he was unwilling to compromise his "Orthodoxy," which was already stretched beyond measure anyway. Still, I think it probable that states of cosmic consciousness were known to him from personal experience. It would be interesting to know whether he left any manuscripts and, if so, what has been their fate.

My account of Florensky's views is of course sketchy and incomplete. I have been able to give here only an outline, not a detailed report, of our talks. A complete exposition of his ideas would have required a volume, of the kind of *The Pillar and Foundation of Truth*. From my association with Florensky I draw the general conclusion that he was a man of immense stature, a powerful personality of rare profundity and incontestable genius. The scope, depth, and originality of his thinking place him in the company of such dominant figures on the human horizon as Plato, Pythagoras, Hermes Trismegistus, the great gnostics. He failed, however, fully to cultivate his special mystical domain. As I intimated above, his intellect prevailed

over his "charisma" and, measured by his spiritual stature, he gave little of his strength to his charismatic rather than his intellectual faculty. In him the motif of loving-kindness, of grace and forgiveness, sounded muted, and he disliked making it sound at all. From him emanated awesome, deep and complex vapors, and he never appeared to me as just "a good and kind man" in the usual sense. Beyond any doubt there was a demoniac element in him, and as indubitably he was an extraordinary man, an outstanding personality, quite beyond comparison with any other prominent man of his time.

Kazakhstan: Russia's Agricultural Crutch

By ROY D. LAIRD and JOHN E. CHAPPELL, JR.

ALTHOUGH Nikita Khrushchev has built his premiership largely on the many reforms he has introduced on the Soviet agricultural scene, agriculture remains his number one domestic problem. His most energetic attempt to remedy deficiencies in this area has been the scheme introduced in 1954 to plow up some 30,000,000 hectares (by now the total is closer to 40,000,000) of virgin and long-fallow lands, principally in the semi-arid steppe regions of southeastern European Russia, southwestern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, and also in eastern Siberia and in the Urals.

The "New Lands" program apparently reached its full development in 1956, by which time the sown area of the entire Union had been rapidly increased by more than 20 per cent, and additional hectares have been added in small amounts since then. A large harvest was not obtained until 1956, but considering the potential of the region, that year brought in an astounding haul, mostly of spring wheat. An uncertain pattern developed in succeeding years, however, marked by a very low total in 1957, another quite high one in 1958, and then drop-offs in 1959 and in 1960. It is certain that the two good years of 1956 and 1958 can be attributed mainly to exceptionally high rainfall and to the initially high fertility of formerly fallow land; both of these factors should logically decline in significance in succeeding years.

While good harvests were brought in elsewhere in the U.S.S.R., the 1960 results were far below plan in the New

Lands.¹ Western observers have been almost as skeptical of the program as the Soviets have been optimistic, and the time is near when an accurate estimate of the permanent value of the New Lands can be made—one which will force one or both camps of experts to modify their judgments. The significance of the scheme is obvious when we note that 62 per cent of the state's grain purchases in 1960 (in spite of the drop in yields there that year) came from New Lands areas.² Since the food supply of the U.S.S.R., and perhaps even the stability of the Khrushchev regime, will be seriously influenced by developments in Kazakhstan, a review of the situation with a careful eye is now in order.

The steppes of the Republic of Kazakhstan encompass some 55 per cent of all the New Lands. As a result, Kazakhstan has become the crutch of the traditional sown areas of the Union in the effort to expand food output. Indeed, the new hectares placed under the plow in Kazakhstan are nearly three times as numerous as in the next largest New Lands area, which, intermixed with a larger proportion of older cultivated areas, is situated in the adjacent regions of southwestern Siberia (similar to northern Kazakhstan in soil and climate). With the edge of the desert perilously close, the threat of creating a huge new dust bowl in Kazakhstan is ever-present. Moreover, problems of climate and soil are not the only obstacles to the success of Mr. Khrushchev's virgin lands scheme in this area. Here also are the human problems that are a part of any colonization process—in this instance, the opposition of the non-Russian inhabitants of the region.

¹The RSFSR exceeded its 1959 production in 1960 (*Izvestia*, November 5, 1960, p. 1), and much of this total came from New Lands regions. But more had been expected, since Siberia—within the RSFSR and containing much New Lands acreage—and Kazakhstan have both shown "great lacks" in 1960 and have "not fulfilled their plans of grain-collection." (*Izvestia*, Oct. 28, 1960, p. 1).

²*Pravda*, December 21, 1960, p. 2.

“NEW LANDS”

NEW LANDS IN THE U. S. S. R.

“NEW LANDS” IN THE U. S. S. R.
Former idle lands developed agriculturally from 1954

Approximate boundary of New Lands given to wheat (Two small areas are off map to E.)

SCALE OF MILES ALONG 50° LAT. :
0 100 200 300

Projection: Lambert's Equal-Area Conic

Map showing the "NEW LANDS" developed in the Soviet Union in 1954, primarily in the Volga region and Central Asia. The map includes labels for the Caspian Sea, Aral Sea, Lake Balkash, and various regions like Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Turkmenistan. A legend indicates the "Approximate boundary of New Lands given to wheat" (1954), with two small areas off the map to the east. A scale bar shows the distance along 50° latitude (0, 100, 200, 300 miles). The projection used is Lambert's Equal-Area Conic.

The Physical Setting. Most of the New Lands in Kazakhstan are in the northern portion of the Republic, to the Siberian side of the Kazakh Uplands, where relatively favorable agricultural conditions prevail. In this region, as compared with the desert to the south, soil alkalinity is less a problem and rainfall is higher; grass grows more easily, supplying humus and darkening the soil. Still, the sixteen-inch annual rainfall line, considered to enclose all areas suitable for most cultivation purposes, encompasses only a small portion of the northeastern corner of the Kazakh Republic. And unfortunately for agricultural purposes, as the aridity decreases so does the temperature, thereby reducing the number of "growing degree-days" available to mature a crop; the last killing frost of spring and the first one in autumn are too close together.

Within limits, the timing of precipitation can be even more important than the absolute amount. Taking this as his cue, T. D. Lysenko has argued that: "The late ripening of grains and their consequent late harvesting (rather than inadequate moisture) is the main difficulty in present-day farming in Siberia, the Urals, and Northern Kazakhstan." Lysenko observes that the lateness of the spring rains, which is normal in the New Lands area, has resulted in less heavy stands of grain when the crop is seeded early. However, late plantings result in late harvests and the danger of heavy losses due to frost in mid-September. This is what occurred in 1959^a and again in 1960.

The Extensive Approach. The New Lands scheme was adopted in defiance of the pessimistic views of official spokesmen such as Bolshakov and Mesyatsev in the early 1920's. The latter declared: "The reserves of land usable as arable without much outlay, in the outlying parts of the country, must be

^a*Pravda*, August 5, 1960. In Lysenko's opinion a change in cultivation practices would allow the harvesting of good crops from early plantings, without any guarantee of additional moisture. As usual he argues that "no matter how much the opponents of Michurinist biology deny them . . .," his schemes will work. Of course, Lysenko's reputation among non-Soviet biologists does not count in his favor.

accepted as by and large exhausted."⁴ A later expert, Laptev, noted that from 1913 to 1938 the area under spring wheat, the principal crop of the Asian plains, had increased only some 4.8 million hectares to a total of 27 million, and he was skeptical of future prospects for expansion. What land could be added to the cultivable area, he declared, could not be planted every year and must remain low in productivity.⁵

Although aware of expert warning against the advisability of radically expanding the sown area,⁶ Mr. Khrushchev realized he must do something, and quickly, about agricultural production. Therefore, in 1954 he decided to take the gamble. What is more, the early successes have led him repeatedly to boast that he has proved the experts wrong.

In the late 'forties, the average wheat yield per acre in the United States was about 17.7 bushels, which is only one-half the yield in such countries as Japan, Denmark, and Great Britain where intensive cultivation is the rule. During the same period in Russia, yields amounted to only 11.2 bushels per acre, and no appreciable increase has been achieved in recent years.⁷ In the nearly normal year of 1953 the yield for the whole of the U.S.S.R. (as calculated from figures in the official statistical handbook) was slightly better than 11 bushels per acre. In the good year of 1958 the implied yield was over 16 bushels.⁸ But

⁴See Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.*, Stanford University Press, 1949, p. 119.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Whereas the Soviets considered all their good land to be already under the plow, in the U.S., where extensive agricultural practice has been too much of a success, there has been and is an excess of good land for the needs of the population.

⁷See *Agricultural Statistics 1948-9: United Kingdom—Part I*, London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952. Also S. E. Johnson, *Changes in American Farming*, Miscellaneous Publication No. 707, United States Department of Agriculture, December, 1949, and Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture*, United States Department of Agriculture, 1951, p. 114.

⁸See *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu*, pp. 369-82, 399, and 403. This excludes minor republics having less than 2% of the total grain area of the Union.

this figure undoubtedly includes the harvest from the 16,000,-000 hectare increase in corn sown in recent years, which should significantly bloat the total grain average. (Corn yields per acre normally approach three or more times the yield of small grains on land receiving adequate moisture.)

Kazakhstan's major crop is grain and, as indicated, anticipated yields in the New Lands must be considerably lower than the national average. But soil, water, and temperature are not the only factors in grain production! The attitude of the Kazakh peasant is also crucial to the long-run success of agriculture in the area.

Russian vs. Kazakh. The Kazakhs, of Turkic origin, have been under Russian influence ever since the early eighteenth century, although solid control was not achieved until the 1860's. The process of Russification, which in the main has been one of Sovietization, has brought great suffering to the Kazakhs. A primitive, nomadic people accustomed to widespread herding and little settled agriculture, the Kazakhs have been forced into various kinds of unskilled labor for their European masters, or else pushed with their livestock into the more arid central and southern regions of their homeland.* Of course, much of this may be interpreted as the inevitable advance of civilization against stubborn holdouts on behalf of primitive ways of life. Without doubt, in many ways the changes have brought material benefits for the local population; but all has been accomplished with the crudity and ruthlessness characteristic of the Stalin era, particularly when the humble peasant was involved. Untold numbers of Kazakhs lost their lives during the collectivization and colonization, when the total number of Kazakhs in the U.S.S.R. dropped from 3,960,000 in 1926 to 3,099,000 in 1939.¹⁰

*R. E. Pipes, "The Soviet Impact on Central Asia," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1957, pp. 27-32.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

The Turkic peoples in all parts of the Union have suffered blows to their intellectual and spiritual culture as well. The Moslem religion has been strongly discriminated against, and Moslem culture is slowly being eradicated. This process has been speeded up by alphabetic reforms which replaced the Arabic script, in which the religious texts are written, first with a Roman alphabet (1920's) and then with a Cyrillic (late 1930's). This cuts the younger generations off from the body of Moslem learning, placing them at an even greater handicap than their Russian Orthodox counterparts in Europe. Central Asian Turks are not known as the most devout Moslems, but still their entire way of life has been impregnated by Moslem customs, and the Soviet antagonism to these customs has been a severe blow to their traditions and to their pride.

Although the treatment of the Kazakh native has become somewhat more humane since de-Stalinization set in, he is still definitely a second-class citizen in his own land. The Kazakh shepherd is not only pushed off the best grazing land, but he is also forced to submit to such indignities as being told to abandon his habitual portable dwelling place and sleep in a wagon instead. Being stubborn, he will not sleep in the wagon if he can help it, and so has nothing. Like the Russian peasant he must absorb the results of stupidity on the higher levels of planning and become subordinate to the foggy ideals of the future Utopia; but for the Kazakh there is the added humiliation of an inferior status.

The Soviet government has sent two chief waves of settlers into Central Asia. The first arrived in the 1930's together with the collectivization drive, causing a change in the Russian population of the area from 600,000 in 1926 to 1,900,000 in 1939. The second wave began to arrive in 1954 with the beginning of the New Lands drive. By comparing maps one can see that the areas selected for settlement by Khrushchev represent little more than the extension of the settlement program started but

not completed by Stolypin half a century earlier.¹¹ We cannot count this second wave of immigrants precisely, but it should not be much less than two million in number, out of a total population increase since 1939 of about four and a half million.¹² As a result, more than half of the inhabitants today are Russians.

All has not been going smoothly with the Russian immigrants, either. They have been too few, too unskilled, and too dissatisfied. Young Communist devotees lured by propaganda extolling the glowing opportunities in the New Lands, have frequently found a reality of disillusionment and despair. Poor living quarters and food supplies have aroused bitter complaints from many. Imported authorities, unfamiliar with the special problems of the region, have made decisions in the dark about such questions as proper work norms, resulting in hardships and low morale among workers. Appeals for labor help, particularly machine operators, from other parts of the Union, have been frequent. A technique of the Soviet leadership has been to appeal especially to the Ukraine for these specialists. The Ukrainians who arrive are thinly scattered over a broad area, thereby assuring their isolation and reducing the effectiveness of their traditional strong desire for independence.

Although confined to a single area and seemingly less dramatic to the outside observer, a second "revolution from above" (the phrase used by Stalin for the forced collectivization in the early 'thirties) has been imposed upon the inhabitants, new and old, of Kazakhstan. As in the earlier case, the total cost in human suffering can never be precisely known, but it must have been great. Extreme and uncontrolled naked force is no longer openly sanctioned as before. Moreover, Premier Khrushchev did not order the physical elimination of the Kazakhs as Stalin

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Narodnoe khozyaistvo, op. cit.*, p. 8 and D. A. Kunayev, *Kazakhstan-skaya pravda*, March 11, 1960. According to Khrushchev, the present population of Kazakhstan is 10,400,000, three million more than in 1954. See *Selskaya zhizn*, March 26, 1961, p. 1.

decreed the "rooting out" of the kulak class. Nevertheless, in his report to the Tenth Party Congress of Kazakhstan, D. A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, admitted that the unsettled nature of the situation in Kazakhstan had required supplementing the regular police with "voluntary peoples militia units" (*dobrovolnye narodnye druzhiny*, perhaps a 1960 version of the "committees of the poor"?). Four thousand such "militia units" totaling more than 132,000 individuals, had been created by early spring of 1960.¹³

Kunayev's report leaves no doubt that the prime target of the vigilante committees is the Kazakh native. The major source of the trouble is indicated as "remnants of the feudal patriarchal past . . . folk customs [and] religious survivals," assertedly manifested in "private-ownership mentality, a disdainful attitude to labor, theft of public property and other ugly, anti-social phenomena."¹⁴ Before the New Lands project can be truly successful such "survivals of the past" must be rooted out, Kunayev declares.

State Grain Factories. At the time of forced collectivization Stalin had pinned great hopes upon his creation of huge state-owned "grain factories." Such sovkhozy would provide grain in quantities that would significantly reduce the dependence of the state upon an uncooperative peasantry. However, by 1934, in his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress, Stalin was forced to admit that his scheme had failed and the grain factories had to be abandoned because they were too great a financial burden on the state. Why? Not only was machinery extremely scarce, but these huge enterprises were "too unwieldy" for their directors to manage properly, and they were also "too specialized"; thus he directed that they be "split up" into smaller, more diversified units.¹⁵ The less stringently con-

¹³Kunayev, *op. cit.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵J. Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, p. 328.

trolled kolkhozy thereby have become the state's prime sources of agricultural produce.

Although the sovkhoz as such was not completely abandoned, for many years the smaller, more diversified sovkhozy that were retained represented a relatively unimportant source of agricultural output. For a long time they served as experimental units, specialized farms, and models of a superior socialist agricultural form. However, in recent years, and particularly in the New Lands region, the sovkhoz has been re-emphasized. Accordingly, by 1958 the sovkhozy occupied slightly over one-third of the total farmed land in the Soviet Union; in Kazakhstan, they comprised nearly three-fifths of the area.¹⁶ More than 500 new sovkhozy account for nearly all of the 21,000,000 newly sown hectares in the republic.¹⁷ Whereas in the whole of the U.S.S.R. the 1958 kolkhoz averaged some 2,000 hectares sown to crops, and the sovkhoz averaged 9,000 hectares, the average New Lands sovkhoz encompassed more than 40,000 hectares (roughly 100,000 acres).¹⁸ There is a striking similarity between Stalin's giant grain factories and Khrushchev's New Lands farms. These too have been created in the double hope of increasing output and decreasing the dependence upon kolkhoz agriculture. In the sovkhoz, state control is more easily managed (at the price of a subsidy, particularly a guaranteed wage not allowed the kolkhoz peasant); and control is even more important than usual for the Soviets in newly developed areas populated by a non-Russian people.

Corn to the Rescue. A chart of the total grain output in Kazakhstan in recent years (based upon Soviet figures) reveals much of the New Lands story. At least three important observations can be made: (1) The success of Kazakh agriculture (and thus the New Lands venture) has been becoming increasingly dependent upon the substitution of corn, with its much

¹⁶*Narodnoe khozyaistvo, op. cit.*, p. 385.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 398 and 515.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 398, 494, 514, 515, and 549.

higher yields, for the small grains in the older, more established areas of the Republic where rainfall is more dependable or irrigation has been established. Thus, by 1960 nearly ten per cent of the sown area was in corn and nearly one-third of the total harvest was dependent upon this crop. (2) Although millions of new hectares have been added to the plan since 1956, the urgent need for expanding the area in fallow, in order to stave off the loss of fertility of the soil, has kept the area actually sown to crops virtually constant. (3) In spite of such soil-saving efforts, however, excluding the year after the 1957 drought there has been a steady decline in yields since 1956, thereby substantiating the prediction of many agronomists that the area is not capable of sustained cultivation over an extended period of years.

As the Minister of Agriculture pointed out, in 1956 the best rainfall in half a century descended upon the republic. And we have also already noted that the initial high fertility of the virgin lands naturally inflated the early yields. Nevertheless, in this best year the average yield for small grains could not have been much over fifteen bushels per acre—hardly spectacular by any standards. In 1953, prior to the plowing up of the virgin lands, a more nearly normal rainfall had produced a small grain yield of eleven bushels per acre. Moreover, in 1957, a year of drought in Kazakhstan, the average yield was about 6 bushels per acre.¹⁹ The following year, the yield again went up, as did the rainfall. The 1959 yields were down to eleven bushels and the 1960 not quite ten bushels per acre.

Moving south from the Siberian border areas of Kazakhstan, we find less emphasis on wheat and less development of the huge grain sovkhoz. Over the arid and semi-arid steppes Kazakh shepherds still range, but they are tied increasingly to

¹⁹The U.S.S.R. as a whole had higher precipitation than Kazakhstan in 1957; and its average yield was about 13.5 bushels per acre. However, allowing for the bloat in this figure due to the inclusion of a greater percentage of corn, the national averages for small grain outside the New Lands must have been close to the normal 11 bushels per acre.

livestock farms. In the river valleys and on the mountain slopes of the south and east, such crops as cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, rice, fruits, and vegetables assume importance, and sunflower

GRAIN OUTPUT IN KAZAKHSTAN

	1953	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
1. Barn harvest of all grains, in 1000's of metric tons*	5,439	23,823	10,575	21,991	19,085	18,706
2. 1000's of hectares sown to all grains ^a	7,026	22,514	22,823	23,245	21,988	22,269
3. 1000's of hectares in corn ^c	40	n.a.	1,063	1,172	1,438	2,100
4. % of total grain area in corn	0.57	n.a.	4.7	5.0	6.5	9.4
5. Corn yield, centners/hectare ^d	24.0	17.5	21.9	25.3	24.1	[25.0]
6. Corn harvest (hectares x yield) in 1000's of metric tons	96	n.a.	2,328	2,965	3,466	5,250
7. 1000's of hectares sown to small grains (all grains minus corn)	6,986	n.a.	21,760	22,073	20,550	20,169
8. Small grain yield, centners/hectare ^e	7.6	10.0 ^f	3.8	8.6	7.6	6.6
9. Barn harvest of small grains, in 1000's of metric tons ^g	5,343	n.a.	8,247	19,026	15,619	13,456

*With the exception of 1960 these figures are cited in *Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: statistichesky sbornik*, 1960, p. 211. 1960 is calculated on the basis of Khrushchev's claim in a speech in Alma Ata on March 21, 1961 that the average annual yield in Kazakhstan for the past five years has been 1,149,000,000 puds (1 centner = 6.1 puds). See *selskaya zhizn*, March 26, 1961, p. 1.

^bWith the exception of 1956 and 1960 these figures are cited in *Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: . . . 1960*, p. 147. 1956 is cited in *Naradnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu*, 1959, p. 399. 1960 is calculated on the basis of Kunayev's report to the Central Committee that the average yield of (all) grain per hectare was 8.4 centners. See *Selskaya zhizn*, January 12, 1961, p. 6.

^cWith the exception of 1960 these figures are cited in *Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: . . . 1960*, pp. 156-7. 1960 is based upon the assumption of the achievement of Kunayev's claim that 1960 would see 2,100,000 hectares planted in corn. See his March 11, 1960, report, *op. cit.*

^d1953-1959 are cited in *Selskoe khozyaistvo . . . sbornik*, pp. 218-21. The 1960 yield is estimated. (25 centners/hectare is equivalent to 37.5 bushels/acre.)

^eEstimated.

^fThese figures for small grains, calculated from data for all grains and for corn (lines 1., 2., 3., 5.), represent wheat almost entirely. Published figures for wheat harvest and yield (*Selskoe khozyaistvo SSSR: . . . 1960*, pp. 214-215) reveal a slight inconsistency in the Soviet statistics, but still correspond closely to these small grain figures.

seeds are grown for their oil. Cotton is, however, the most vital crop of the area. But for the republic as a whole, grain crops, predominantly spring wheat (plus some millet, oats, and barley and an increasing amount of corn), dominate the agricultural scene. Of 28,661,000 hectares sown in 1958, 23,245,000 were given to grain crops.²⁰

Return to Normal. Certain segments of the New Lands have produced good harvests in 1960—Chkalov and Omsk provinces in the RSFSR, and Northern Kazakhstan province as well, have exceeded their plans.²¹ But for many other areas, in the Urals, in Siberia, and in Kazakhstan, results have been bad. In Kazakhstan, they have been so bad that the farms answered the call for a 24,600,000 ton output in the 1960 plan,²² with a relatively meager 18,700,000 tons, as the table above shows. Detailed analysis of the failure has not yet been made, but preliminary reports declared bad weather the villain again, as in 1959.²³ A report in *Pravda* on December 19, 1959 by the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party and the Kazakh Republic Council of Ministers charged the less serious shortages of 1959 to unfavorable weather in the spring. In 1960, spring and summer rainfall was fairly good, but it was followed by an early fall frost, which, together with inadequate harvesting and storage facilities, doomed a large portion of the crop to die unharvested under the winter's snow.

In 1958 Kazakhstan had provided the state with 15,082,000 tons of grain, whereas only 11,475,000 tons (90% of it wheat), were delivered to the state in the 1959 season,²⁴ and 1960 deliveries were down to 10,525,000 tons.²⁵ Nevertheless, this represented nearly a 40% increase over the previous six-year average

²⁰*Narodnoe khozyaistvo*, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-401.

²¹See *Izvestia*, Oct. 28, 1960, p. 1, and Nov. 3, 1960, p. 1.

²²Kunayev, *op. cit.*

²³*Izvestia*, Nov. 3, 1960, p. 1.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Kunayev's 1961 report to the Central Committee, *Selskaya zhizn*, January 12, 1961, p. 6.

(including 1954 and 1955, when the program was just getting under way and the weather was not particularly good), and some 35% increase over 1953, before the New Lands program had begun. According to Kunayev the delivered grain fell short of the quota by only 1,540,000 tons in 1959 and nearly 2,500,000 tons (some 20%) in 1960.²⁶ Although the situation, even considering the low 1960 total, is not yet calamitous, what will happen when several consecutive bad years are encountered, as is likely soon? Areas of scanty rainfall usually show also a great undependability of rainfall, with consecutive bad years more frequent than consecutive good ones. On a long-range basis, an agricultural economy dependent upon such areas is in a precarious position. As we have seen, however, corn planting in the more reliable areas of the Republic has made an increasingly important contribution to the Kazakh grain harvests. No wonder, therefore, that Kunayev's promises include expanding the corn area to 4,500,000 hectares in 1962. In terms of total grain output such planting would go a long way toward compensating for an eventual failure of the New Lands.²⁷

Other crops, less important to the New Lands scheme than wheat, fared better in 1959. Cotton, for instance—depending on irrigation ditches rather than on local rainfall—reached an all-time high in 1958 with a harvest of 4,373,000 tons in the entire U.S.S.R.; this was increased to 4,614,000 tons in 1959.²⁸ The livestock program is also proceeding successfully, according to Kunayev's report in January 1961. For example, 655,000 tons of meat (against 600,000 according to plan) was sold to the state in 1960.²⁹ Nevertheless, Kunayev's earlier confidence that, by 1965, at the end of the current seven-year plan, 1,250,000 tons of meat in slaughter weight (mainly beef and mutton)

²⁶See *Pravda*, December 25, 1959, and Kunayev's 1961 report, *op. cit.*

²⁷See Kunayev's 1960 report, *op. cit.*

²⁸*Naradnoe khozyaistvo*, *op. cit.*, p. 428 and *Pravda*, December 30, 1959.

²⁹*Selskaya zhizn*, January 12, 1961.

would be delivered to the state, is surely overly optimistic.³⁰

More skilled personnel are needed, Kunayev indicated, pointing out one of the serious problems in Kazakhstan's agricultural picture. Therefore, mechanization schools to supplement the forty-six in existence at the end of 1959 are planned. Within two or three years—again an extremely swift solution to all problems is expected—there should be 65,000 trained tractor drivers, and assertedly each farm will have a sufficient number of machine operators to avoid the present annoying practice of having to send people from cities to help with harvesting. Better organization of labor, says Kunayev, with "drive, concreteness, and efficiency"³¹ applied to the tasks, can overcome other handicaps, as it did in exceeding the wheat quotas in Akmolinsk, north of Karaganda, during the generally disappointing 1959 season. Sloppy harvesting lost much wheat in 1959.

Although poor weather has been recognized as a villain, individual administrators have not been cheated of their share of the blame. In the recent "Khrushchev dialogues" Kunayev did not come off unscathed. The whole story on the demotion of the former Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, is yet to be told, but his replacement in December of 1960 by M. A. Olshansky, and the assignment of Matskevich to Kazakhstan to head up the newly created Virgin Lands Territory, cannot be divorced from the disappointments of the past two years.³² Indeed, when a group of Soviet educators and propagandists visited The University of Kansas in late April, 1961, their emphatic response was that bad management had been the major cause of the problems in the New Lands Area.

A further problem is revealed by complaints about existing grain storage facilities, in particular the serious shortages of elevators and dryers. This year's total construction of storage facilities reached only 25% of quota (enough for 207,400 tons

³⁰See *Pravda*, December 25, 1959.

³¹See D. A. Kunayev, *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, March 11, 1960.

³²See *Selskaya zhizn*, December 30, 1960, p. 1.

of grain) by July 1. As a result, the Republic Council of Ministers has been blamed for not exercising sufficiently close control over the fulfillment of the plans.³³ Unless this work can be speeded, even meeting the optimistic quotas for harvesting will not ensure provision of expected amounts of grain to consumers.

What Lies Ahead? The initial successes of the virgin lands scheme cannot be denied. 1960 may, or may not, signal a return to the more normal pattern of scant moisture in the Kazakhstan-Southwestern Siberia region. On the one hand, we have had warnings of imminent dust bowl conditions, which would strip the topsoil and wreak havoc upon the land's fertility. On the other hand, the 1960 results do not necessarily forebode such a disaster.

In any case, the Soviets are aware of potential dangers, and they have discussed possible solutions. For one, Kunayev referred in his 1960 report to a mandate to emphasize crop rotations and to place up to one-fifth of the arable land in fallow.³⁴ Close studies have been made of the dust storms of Northern Kazakhstan and of methods to prevent them and reduce their damaging effect. The principal protective measures being employed are planting of grass cover and of forest shelter belts. However, extensive efforts are needed to provide real protection, and as yet both the experimental work and the construction of shelter belts, etc., are only in the initial stages.

Dreams of vast irrigation systems giving an abundant water supply independent of local rainfall continually entice the New Lands pioneers, but some of these schemes are totally impracticable, and others are put off because of the huge expense involved. Only in the cotton-growing regions of Central Asia has irrigation been developed extensively, and this water is of no use to the bulk of the wheat lands.³⁵

The future is certain to be dark with continued trouble over

³³See *Izvestia*, July 7, 1960.

³⁴*Op. cit.*

personnel in the New Lands. The Kazakh shepherds have been able to put up little overt resistance to Soviet expansion, but perhaps they have aggravated the despair among the transplanted Russians, as indicated by a high turnover among both management and labor. In 1959 alone, 48% of the first secretaries of district party committees and 53% of the chairmen of district executive committees in Kazakhstan were replaced. As of March 1960, only 26% of the sovkhozy chairmen had been in their positions for more than three years. In one province, where eighty-four "thirty thousanders" were sent in 1954,³⁵ only twenty remain.³⁶ No wonder repeated appeals continue to go out for even more immigrants into the area. Apparently, then, there are two pressing problems of personnel on all levels: one, to import enough capable people to fill the jobs; and two, to provide decent conditions which will make them satisfied with their lot.

In promoting the New Lands scheme, Mr. Khrushchev is facing a problem that extends beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, and which looms larger in significance as the rate of increase of the world's population mounts: how to squeeze additional precious food from marginally useful land. However, in his slap-dash enthusiasm he has paid insufficient attention to agricultural improvement of an intensive nature and has exhibited a reluctance to invest the capital required to bring such necessities as sufficient irrigation to the steppes to safeguard them against the undependable natural precipitation. These goals are not out of the question, if they are recognized as im-

³⁵Not only farmers, but industrialists too are interested in an increased water supply, in order to develop the considerable mineral reserves in Kazakhstan. Additional water is essential in great amounts for smelting operations, as well as for the daily use of a growing worker population. Various Kazakh leaders have called for the construction of canals that would be a boon to industry and agriculture alike, but they are still only unfulfilled hopes. See *Izvestia*, November 27 and December 7, 1958.

³⁶In 1954 Khrushchev called for 30,000 party and non-party activists to go voluntarily into agriculture and offer themselves as farm chairmen.

³⁷Kunayev's 1960 report, *op. cit.*

portant; witness the Japanese farmer who ekes out of his narrow plot between the mountain and the sea per-acre yields several times greater than his hectare-foolish Russian counterpart, or the Israeli husbandman who has turned perforce to a near-desert for food and made it bloom. But limitations have been built into the Soviet system which make such results unlikely. For one, the tedious, tender care of the Japanese for his private plot is not likely to be repeated in a land where individual initiative is discouraged, and personal incentive subordinated to the impersonal state. For another, the U.S.S.R. has traditionally reserved its heavy investments for basic industry, and let agriculture grovel along on the scraps. Beyond the impressive industrial base that has been created, increasing military expenditures have also come in for a higher priority in use of capital.

By Soviet standards the New Lands of Kazakhstan cannot as yet be written off as a failure or even a mistake. If measured by Western liberal standards, wherein the choice of making public investments is ultimately tied to popular values, rather than the goals (be they idealistic or selfish) of those in the seats of power, the New Lands scheme would be regarded as a wasteful mistake. However, given the Soviet context, Mr. Khrushchev's successor may praise or damn him for the scheme. Although the traditional Russian method of solving a food shortage seems to us deficient, through persistence some useful results may come out of this approach. With a centralized economy, temporary failures in one region can be more easily written off against success elsewhere without need to abandon the weaker investments. Moreover, there may yet be time for development of extensive shelter belts and irrigation systems before a long series of dry years can drive the New Lands to ruin. Meanwhile, however, an expanding Russian population is becoming increasingly dependent for its food upon a marginal area and a scheme for its exploitation that is at best unpredictable.

The Bund and Lenin Until 1903

By HENRY J. TOBIAS

The Bund's withdrawal from the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in August, 1903, is a well-known fact.¹ It was the logical outgrowth of a conflict which had begun two years earlier between the Jewish social democratic organization and Lenin's *Iskra*. Their dispute offers insight into the state of the national question in Russia with special emphasis on the Jewish population and illustrates Lenin's tactics against his opponents in his efforts to gain his ends.

The differences between Lenin and the Bund grew out of their responses to historical circumstances. The Bund had been founded in October, 1897, by representatives of social democratic committees in the Pale of Settlement, the region in which the Russian Jews lived. These committees had grown out of small circles of Jewish university students and workers who met as early as the mid-1880's to read and discuss forbidden topics secretly.

The members of these circles, largely assimilated to Russian culture and nurtured on the revolutionary tradition, were often unwilling and unable to participate directly in the life of the Jewish masses. They sought instead to bring radical wisdom to a small number of intelligent workers, their efforts resembling in some respects the labors of the earlier populists to awaken the peasantry to a new future. T. M. Kopelson, a member of the Vilno circle in the late 1880's, expressed its aim succinctly. "We were for assimilation," he said, "we did not even dream of a

¹The full name of the Bund is the General League of Jewish Workers of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia.

special Jewish mass movement . . . Our task was developing cadres for the Russian revolutionary movement . . . "²

The focus of the circles began to change in the early 1890's. By that time the membership had accepted Marxism. Industrial expansion and increasing numbers of strikes forced all Social Democrats in Russia to re-evaluate their activities. They began to organize and lead the workers, using open agitation as a means to show them the connection between their economic difficulties and the oppression of the tsarist regime.

Open agitation entailed far-reaching changes for the circles in the Pale. The assimilated Jewish revolutionaries had to employ Yiddish, the native idiom of the workers, in order to reach them. Having little knowledge of the language, they recruited students from the Yeshivas, the higher Jewish schools, altering the original homogeneous character of their organizations. Close contact with the workers drew the Jewish Social Democrats into their problems and milieu, weakening their loyalty to Russian culture. They began to link national oppression to the general political and economic struggle of social democracy by the demand for equal civil rights. In 1895, Julius Martov, an assimilated Jew and the future leader of the Mensheviks, stressed that the Jews had to fight their own way to freedom or they would not deserve to have it.³ In effect, the Jewish Social Democrats abandoned their aim of training cadres for the Russian movement and, substituting the conviction that a revolution had to have its roots in its own environment, began to form a Jewish movement.

Many circumstances contributed to the formation of the Bund. National awareness and the trend toward unification among the Russian committees fostered parallel moves among the Jewish groups. The founding congress of the Bund felt

²T. M. Kopelson, "Evreiskoe rabochee dvizhenie kontsa 80-kh i nachala 90-kh godov," *Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie sredi evreev*, Moscow, 1930, I, 71.

³*Di Naie Epokhe in der Yiddisher Arbeiter Bevegung (The New Epoch in the Jewish Labor Movement)*, Geneva, 1900, pp. 9-10.

that a single central committee could represent the united Jewish groups whenever the Russians decided to form a united party and resolved to join such a party as an autonomous section with the right to make decisions in all Jewish matters.⁴ Practical grounds also guided the Bundists' actions since only they could supply Yiddish literature to the Jewish worker and they knew his problems better than anyone else. Thus, at its inception the Bund decided to maintain a separate identity and to work with the Russians.

When the Bund joined with several Russian committees in March, 1898, to found the RSDLP, the new party granted autonomy to it without dispute. The RSDLP disappeared immediately after its establishment, however, as the result of a series of arrests and became a fiction for all practical purposes. The Bund lost valuable personnel as a result of these circumstances but nevertheless continued to grow rapidly. By mid-1901 it began to organize Jewish workers in the south, forcing its members to consider their relationship toward existing Russian social democratic organizations and the Jewish workers who already belonged to them. The awakening of the Jewish community, sparked by revolutionary feeling and Zionism, brought the national question into prominence. The issue had already been debated fruitlessly at the Third Congress of the Bund in 1899, but by mid-1901 it had become more urgent. The Bund had become a virtually independent party, exercising a wide range of activities in response to existing conditions in the Russian Empire.

Lenin and several friends, including Martov and A. N. Potresov, conceived *Iskra*, both as an organization and a journal, during their Siberian exile in the last years of the 1890's. Perturbed by the growth of Economism, a trend which appeared to them to favor economic gains at the expense of political power, and by the weak state of revolutionary organization in Russia,

⁴*Di Arbeiter Shtime, (The Worker's Voice)*, No. 6, October, 1897, cols. 1-4.

they believed that concentration on broad political goals, construction of a strong organization, and creation of a party organ to awaken the worker would solve social democracy's difficulties.⁵ Upon their release in 1900, the exiles proceeded to Europe where they joined forces with G. V. Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism. Their journal, *Iskra*, began to appear regularly in late 1900. The editors made clear their desire to become the guiding center of Russian social democracy and to win the support of local groups in Russia through their agents and literary influence.⁶

Despite the long association of the leading *Iskra*ites with the Bund, relations cooled in 1901. S. I. Yezhov-Tsederbaum, an *Iskra* agent who sought the Bund's support to smuggle *Iskra* into Russia, indicated that only the leaders read it and that they displayed little sympathy toward it.⁷ Vladimir Kossovsky, one of the most important leaders of the Bund, revealed that the Bundists suspected the dictatorial tendencies of *Iskra*.⁸ Deterioration of relations thus began with the appearance of *Iskra*.

The open conflict between the Bund and *Iskra* stemmed from the resolutions passed at the Bund's Fourth Congress of May, 1901. The delegates, considering national problems in Russia, concluded that each nation, in addition to its hopes for civil and economic freedoms, had national aspirations which grew out of its individuality. The Pole, the Jew, and the Finn had the right to oppose infringement or even the possibility of restraint upon their national life. To achieve justice many delegates wanted the future Russia to become a federation of nationalities with each nation ruling its own internal destinies. They envisaged the solution of the Jewish national problem in terms of cultural

⁵V. I. Lenin, "Nasha programma," *Sochineniya*, 3rd edition, Moscow, 1935, II, 490 and "Nasushchnyi vopros," *Sochineniya*, II, 500, 503.

⁶V. I. Lenin, "S chego nachat," *Iskra*, No. 4, May, 1901, p. 1 and Lenin to Radchenko, *Leninskii sbornik*, Moscow, 1928, VIII, 167.

⁷K. I. Zakharova-Tsederbaum i S. I. Tsederbaum, *Iz epokhi "Iskry"* (1900-1905), Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p. 54.

⁸V. Kossovsky, "Martov un di Russishe Sotsial-Demokratie," ("Martov and Rusian Social Democracy) *Di Zukunft*, XIX, March, 1924, p. 176.

autonomy without reference to any given territory, in contrast to the homeland which the Zionists preferred. Having no doubt that the term "nationality" applied fully to the Jewish people, the Congress added the principle of equal national rights to the existing demand for equal civil rights.⁹

Its concern with the national question led the Fourth Congress to examine the Bund's relation to the RSDLP. Some delegates considered the Bund's autonomous status inadequate and wanted to change it to a federative one at the next party congress. Reaffirming its national-cultural views, the Bund resolved to aid Jewish workers in southern Russia whose needs were not satisfied by the Russian committees through the creation of new organizations although such groups were not to be created where they might harm the Russian movement.¹⁰

When the resolutions appeared, the Iskraites challenged them. They disparaged the federative solution of the national problem as premature and charged that nationalism had grown up in Jewish social democracy in western Russia and Poland. Martov, who led the Iskraite attack, criticized the Bund for its efforts to squeeze Jewish workers into narrow nationalist channels when the chief evil afflicting them was a government policy which retarded their rapprochement with the surrounding population. He pointedly contrasted the Bund's behavior with that of the Jewish workers in the south who worked hand in hand with their Russian comrades for the general demands of the proletariat. The Iskraites reminded the Bund, in addition, that it could not change party structure or the status granted to it by the First Congress of the RSDLP unilaterally.¹¹

The Bund's resolutions and *Iskra*'s comments demarcate the basic quarrel. The issue rested in part on the national question but remained vague. The Iskraites avoided direct comment

⁹IV-i s'ezd vseobshchego Eureiskago rabochego soiuza v Litve, Polshe i Rossii, Geneva, 1901, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 18, 23.

¹¹*Iskra*, No. 7, August, 1901, p. 6.

on the nature of the Jews but deprecated nationalism. They attacked the federative solution for future Russia but offered no substitute proposal. The Bund merely affirmed its belief in a Jewish nationality and insisted on future security for all nations.

Martov revealed his attitude toward Jewish nationality by implication. He regarded both the Bund's national objectives and the discriminatory policies of the government as harmful since they separated the Jewish worker from the surrounding population. The Bund's stand for civil equality, the closest kind of legal rapprochement, apparently did not suffice for him. As a Jew who had assimilated himself to Russian culture he may have unconsciously preferred complete cultural rapprochement. Closer definition of language would reveal the full extent of the gulf between Iskraite and Bundist on the Jewish question.

The sharp remarks of the Iskraites on party organization reveal how important this matter was to them. Their legal stand with respect to the proposed changes in the party indicated that they wanted an organizational unity that would override considerations of nationality.

Martov's asides, made to flatter the Jewish workers of the south, clarify the practical basis of the criticism. The Iskraites did not want any competitors where they were building their own organization. The Bund's actions were therefore described as driving a wedge between Jewish and Christian workers. The open polemic ended temporarily in the late summer of 1901, but the hostility remained.

In March, 1902, the Bund and several other groups, all uncommitted to *Iskra*, attempted to end social democratic disunity by calling a congress of the RSDLP in Belostok. The Iskraites, although invited to attend, deplored the effort, regarding it privately as a maneuver to stave off their own future congress.¹² They labored to forestall the gathering on the

¹²I. Volkovicher, "V. I. Lenin i sobiranie partii vokrug staroi 'Iskry,'" *Proletarskaya revoliutsiya*, No. 3 (1924), 63. *Leninskii sbornik*, VIII, 214.

grounds that it was premature and dispatched a delegate to convince the assemblage to alter its status to that of a preparatory conference. The delegate succeeded in his mission because the assembly felt that too few committees attended to warrant the designation of congress.¹³

The Belostok Conference, in the course of its labors, created an Organization Committee to prepare for the future congress. Large-scale arrests, however, soon thwarted its plans. Having considered such a contingency, the Conference had decreed that the re-establishment of the Organization Committee should be the concern "of all the participants of the Conference."¹⁴ The Bund, which was hard hit by the arrests and by new problems, found it impossible to extend any initiative toward re-creation of the Organization Committee. For the Iskraites, however, the arrests served as an opportunity rather than as a misfortune since Lenin decided to use the circumstances to build the Committee according to his tastes.

Lenin revealed his talent as a political tactician in the ensuing events. He worked to bring the Iskraites control of the Organization Committee before its existence became public. By mid-August, 1902, N. Krupskaya, his wife and secretary, wrote that Iskraite organizations were discussing the formation of an Organization Committee and that a Bund representative could join it later. "Meanwhile," she continued, "the Organization Committee is not reconstituted and no one except our people knows about it; it consists of our people exclusively."¹⁵ Lenin, in a letter to an *Iskra* agent, warned him to be careful with the Bund, advising him not to allow it to "poke its nose into Russian affairs. . . ."¹⁶ Lenin, who approved criticism of

¹³V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, V, 69; O. A. Ermansky, *Iz perezhitogo* (1887-1921 gg.) Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 58; P. An-Man, "Belostoker Period in Leben fun Ts-K. fun 'Bund,'" ("The Belostok Period in the Life of the C.C. of the 'Bund'"), *Roiter Pinkus*, Warsaw, 1921, I, 69.

¹⁴Rossiiskaya Sots.-Dem. Rabochaya Partiya, *Vtoroi ocherednoi s'ezd*, Geneva, 1903, p. 20.

¹⁵*Leninskii sbornik*, XIII, 272-273.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 258.

the Bund for its national tendencies, thus suggested the use of crude national expressions to ensure his success. As the strongest obstacle to his design, the Bund had to be watched and he spared no effort to achieve his aim.

The formal re-establishment of the Organization Committee took place at Pskov in November, 1902. Despite the instructions of the Belostok Conference, the composition of the two meetings differed markedly. Only three of the seven organizations represented at Belostok appeared at Pskov. The Bund remained unrepresented. If the Iskraites had followed the rule of insufficient representation that had guided the Belostok delegates, the Pskov meeting should not have reconstituted the Organization Committee. They did not hesitate, however, and appeared delighted with the results. Lepeshinsky, at whose home the meeting took place, wrote, "Thanks to the absence of the 'opposition' (the representative of the Bund would surely have held up the business at every step), the Conference solved the most important questions in one day."¹⁷

Iskra's unilateral formation of the Organization Committee, a flagrant violation of the Belostok arrangements, disturbed the Bund deeply. Faced by a *fait accompli*, the Bund attempted to strengthen itself and gain support by justification of its position in broad terms. In a commentary on the Organization Committee's announcement of its existence, it argued that since the First Congress of the RSDLP had been a failure, the forthcoming meeting should be considered a founding congress. As such, all social democratic organizations, including national organizations, should participate. This was the only way to build a centralized, disciplined army.¹⁸

In another commentary, the Bund stressed its unique and valuable position. It criticized an appeal made by the Ekaterinoslav Committee to the local Jewish workers movement in Russia. Declaring that the Ekaterinoslav comrades had erred

¹⁷P. Lepeshinsky, *Na poverote*, 3rd edition, Moscow, 1935, p. 147.

¹⁸*Posledniya Izvestiya*, No. 106, Feb. 3, 1903.

in pointing up similarities between Russia and western Europe with regard to Jewish development, the Bund emphasized that the Jews in Russia had an independent revolutionary movement and that those in western Europe did not.¹⁹

Lenin's reply reflected his newly strengthened position. He defended the Organization Committee and the Ekaterinoslav Committee, which leaned toward *Iskra*. It would have been a breach of unity in the proletarian class struggle, he maintained, for Ekaterinoslav to discuss the separate forces of the Jewish proletariat. He described the Bund's attack as an act of an organization outside the party, a consequence of its insistence on federation which led it toward an independence it did not need. Only a single, centralized organization supported by the entire proletariat without distinction of language or nationality could fight Tsarism.²⁰ As in the first polemic, Lenin rested his case on the dictates of party discipline and legality. He lashed the Bund for its open criticism of the Organization Committee, interpreting the act as part of a scheme to alter the party's organization illegally and as a violation of the RSDLP rules.²¹ Addressing himself obliquely to the Jewish proletariat, he stated that they understood the need for the closest unity with the Russians and that the way to build a strong organization was to form a nucleus first and then to link it with other organizations.²²

The debate became acrimonious. Lenin employed grammatical devices to emphasize his views. When he used the phrase "of the forces . . . of the Jewish proletariat," for example, he inserted the parenthetical comment "impotent" after the word "forces."²³ The Bund, in its turn, reminded all that

¹⁹"Po povodu odnoi proklamatsii," *Posledniy Izvestiya*, No. 105, January 15/28, 1903, pp. 1-2.

²⁰V. I. Lenin, "Nuzhna li samostoyatelnaya politicheskaya partiya evreiskomu proletariatu." *Sochineniya*, V, 3rd edition, pp. 245-249. The article appeared originally in *Iskra*, No. 34, February 15, 1903.

²¹*Iskra*, No. 33, February 1, 1903, p. 4.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Sochineniya*, V. 247.

the Organization Committee, by its own admission, was a privately created organization and that *Iskra's* chastisement of the Bund was a device to give the Committee official status. The Bund justified its right to self-defense against a private group that portrayed it in a bad light. It accused *Iskra* of striving for hegemony and finding the Bund's existence intolerable for that reason. The scorn that *Iskra* heaped on the Jewish workers revealed its imperialism and made them an auxiliary detachment.²⁴

The Bund regarded *Iskra's* charges that it had violated the RSDLP rules with astonishment since they had never existed in practice. Whom did *Iskra* ask, the Bund inquired, when it became not only a local organization, but a general one with a network of agents all over Russia? In effect, had it not created a new party and bedecked itself with the title of the old one?²⁵

When both sides summed up their arguments in the spring of 1903, Lenin insisted that an independent Jewish party would be weak and was just as unnecessary as such a party would be for the workers of the Urals. The new path required an end to the independence which allowed every organization to act as it saw fit. The *Iskraites* admitted their desire for temporary hegemony. Once they unified the party, however, a special organization like *Iskra* would be superfluous. Life demanded the triumph of its "imperialistic" principles.²⁶

The Bund noted carefully the comparison made between it and an organization such as might exist for the workers of the Urals. *Iskra* considered it a regional rather than a national organization. The Bund insisted, however, that the needs of the Jewish worker were the key to its activity, not geography. The regional viewpoint led the Polish socialists to deny a place for the Bund in Poland and the Russians to restrict it in Russia.

²⁴*Posledniya Izvestiya*, No. 112, March 1, 1903, p. 2.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁶"Edinaya russkaya sotsialdemokratiya i interesy evreiskogo proletariata," *Iskra*, No. 36, March 15, 1903, p. 4. The author of the article was probably Martov.

Separate demands for equal civil rights for Jews appeared senseless from the regional viewpoint since they could scarcely apply to a small geographic area.²⁷ The Bund rested its case on cultural distinctions, not geography.

The Bund also clarified the position which the Iskraites assigned to the Jewish proletariat. *Iskra* designated as the opposition those who opposed the Russian proletariat, that is, *Iskra*. It assumed that victory hinged on the awakening of the Russian proletariat. It expected the Jewish movement to devote its strength to the larger group, which the Iskraites equated with the "general All-Russian movement." To the Bundists, the argument recalled the assimilationist ideas of the 1880's. The revolutionary assimilator was incapable of understanding the significance which the Jewish movement had for itself. Nor did the Bundists consider the general movement equivalent to the Russian proletariat. Parties united in order to work according to a single plan, but to generate the greatest amount of revolutionary energy, every national group had to have equal rights. The crux of the dispute on party structure lay not in the building of a nucleus but in the conditions on which the nucleus should be built. The answer to the question, what is the Bund, a regional organization or a representative of the proletariat of a whole nation, held the answer to the conflict between limited autonomy and equality in federation. Unification of Russian organizations could create only a Russian, not an All-Russian, party.²⁸

Preparations for the Second Congress continued behind the public debate. The Bund joined the Organization Committee in February, 1903, and faced a difficult situation. The Committee upheld the Iskraite position staunchly and carried out its work without the Bund representative insofar as this was possible. On one occasion it even advised local committees to

²⁷ (V. Kossovsky), *Autonomie oder Federatsie (Autonomy or Federation)*, London, 1903, p. 22.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-26..

threaten the Bund with war if it did not abandon its groups where others already existed. The Iskraites admitted privately that they had no right to exert pressure through the Organization Committee.²⁹ The Bund representative knew this but nevertheless kept silent.

Lenin acknowledged the importance of the Bund problem as early as December, 1902, by placing it first on the agenda. In a letter to an Organization Committee member he stated that if federation won out it would be necessary to split at once and to have separate sessions. Everyone had to prepare for this. The possibility of a rupture had already occurred to him seven months before the Second Congress and his readiness to follow through was apparent.

Lenin's determination to split with the Bund if it did not accept his conditions remained firm. Although the open polemic on the Organization Committee ended temporarily in April, the dispute on the principle of party organization did not. Lenin wrote that there could be no talk of that. He felt that only by preparing for war with the Bund would it be possible to effect its surrender.³⁰

With respect to the behavior of the Organization Committee, Lenin was more cautious. He told the Iskraites to be correct in their relations with the Bund, adding parenthetically that they should not hit it directly in the teeth. The Bund must not be given cause for leaving. Agreeing that intercession for *Iskra* by the Organization Committee was improper, he suggested that the members act personally in the local committees that recognized the leadership of *Iskra* to thwart the Bund. It was possible to prepare the committees against the Bund, however, without infringement of proper form.³¹

The Bundists also reflected on their position. They knew they could not revolt alone. Their success depended upon a

²⁹*Leninskii sbornik*, VIII, 350-351.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 340.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 355-356.

subtle cultural and political relationship to the Russians. The relatively mild tone they adopted in Yiddish articles toward *Iskra* indicated their desire to minimize the differences between the Russians and themselves. Their adherence to the Organization Committee despite adverse conditions verifies their fear of isolation.

The Bund readied itself for the Second Congress of the RSDLP at its own Fifth Congress in June, 1903. Having rejected independence on historical-territorial grounds, the majority clung to the idea of broad cultural and civil independence. The Congress wanted the Bund to stay in the party but also expressed the limits of that desire by resolving upon a minimum program as a *sine qua non*. It demanded recognition as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat and that no territorial limitations be placed upon its activities.³² The Bundists thus also prepared to withdraw from the Congress if their conditions were not granted, despite the gloomy prospects for the Jewish movement in Russia.

The Second Congress confirmed what both organizations expected. The Bund's demands were rejected and its delegates departed. The significance of their withdrawal lay in the fact that an organization which considered itself national and seriously sought to retain its integrity was forced to leave a party led by Lenin. The Bund felt that the position to which Lenin wanted to relegate the Jewish workers reflected contempt for them as a nationality, if not as individuals. The tone of his articles and the tactics he employed in forming the Organization Committee tended to strengthen this feeling.

Lenin openly confirmed the assimilationism that the Bundists had sensed a short time after the Second Congress by denying that the Jews were a nation.³³ Under the circumstances, the Bund would have become superfluous. Lenin, in his deter-

³²*V-yei s'ezd vseobshchego evreiskogo rabochego soiuza v Litve, Polshe i Rossii*, London, 1903, p. 6.

³³*V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya*, VI, 84..

mination to build a strong party, exhibited the ruthless tenacity and aggressiveness that characterized his entire career. He violated rules and attempted at the same time to retain an atmosphere of legality. Although his plans were perhaps not consciously based on the importance of the Great Russian nationality, his identification of the Russian and the general movement, as noted by the Bundists, implicitly assumed it. The Jews were unimportant. Not being a nation, they would disappear and they, therefore, needed no special representation beyond the minimal degree necessary temporarily for communication. Many facets of the behavior of the Communists toward multi-national life in Russia were already evident in Lenin's actions, and if one takes into consideration that he was not in a position of power, some of their answers were also implicit.

Book Reviews

DALLIN, DAVID J. *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin*. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1961. 543 pp. \$7.95.

Anyone attempting a general survey of recent Soviet foreign policy on the grand scale that David Dallin has in this book deserves an A for effort no matter what the results. This type of study is difficult enough for the policy of a democratic state, thanks to the double problem of overabundance of some material (tons of public documents, press and periodical articles, and interpretive studies) and the unavailability of other material (the primary archival sources) the absence of which may be devastating. For a study of Soviet policy those obstacles are much higher, for obvious reasons: the mountains of published material are so largely unrewarding and the blackout of primary source material can be almost total. The technique of deducing fact from the hints and obscurities of what appears in print has been developed into a fine art, but also a dangerous one for professional reputations.

Mr. Dallin does not need any special consideration from reviewers on account of the difficulties of his chosen task. He has the feel of Soviet reality. He knows from years of experience and study how its leaders are motivated. At the same time, unlike many in this field, he knows the limits of speculative writing. Except in certain

spots he does not venture far from his available material. His book therefore rates high on performance as well as effort, even if it does not offer anything very new by way of fact or fancy. Unfortunately the author does not point often enough to the gaps and the unknown areas. By the very fullness of its treatment the book gives the impression that it has said all there is to say, or at least all we need to know. Sometimes that is so, sometimes not.

The first hundred pages or so describe Stalin's foreign policies in his last years, the rigid lines of action that had produced great gains but had also brought the Soviet Union to a dead end in so many aspects of its world strategy: in the Far East (Korea and Japan), in the Middle East, in relations with Yugoslavia, and not least in the nature of the confrontation with the United States and its Western allies. Stalin's legacy, as Mr. Dallin points out, was one of belligerence and defiance and "conflicts everywhere." The remainder of the book tells the story of the subsequent "relaxation," the confused mixture of Stalinism and anti-Stalinism that marked the "Malenkov-Molotov era," the new strategy of the "first Khrushchev era" (to 1957), and the present course with "Khrushchev in command."

Perhaps as good a way as any to judge *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* is to raise some questions about this period, points that are crucial to the West's assessment of

what Soviet policies really are and how they got that way, and see how full and convincing the author is in his explanations. I am not speaking of the flock of relatively secondary items on which specialists may raise doubts or questions about the author's interpretations or omissions on Soviet policy here, there and everywhere. Some may disagree with him on such points as Khrushchev's tactics in dealing with Tito, Soviet policy in Iran during the Mosaddeq period, China's role in Eastern Europe, the failure to move in Iraq in 1959, or the significance of the U-2 affair. The value of the book is that it contains so much that is useful on so many of these questions, that the author is always calm, scholarly, and well armed with supporting material. It is more helpful to look at the broader aspects, such as the following: the basic elements of continuity and discontinuity from the Stalin era to that of Khrushchev; the bearing of foreign policy questions on the struggle for power within the Soviet leadership; the reality of the conflict with Communist China and its meaning for the future of the Communist world; the reasons behind Soviet shifts and turns on the matter of disarmament; the general directions of Soviet policy since Stalin—whether by design or by inevitable trends in Soviet society—toward further expansion and conquest, détente and real coexistence, or frustration and collapse.

It is by looking for light on such questions that one sees both the strengths and the weaknesses of Mr. Dallin's effort. On the nature of the departures from Stalinism he is clear and convincing. On the

role of individual leaders he is less sure. What was Malenkov's influence on the foreign policies of the "Malenkov-Molotov era" and how was it related to his rivalry with Khrushchev? What were the factional differences on Eastern Europe, on China, on relations with the United States? The question of Soviet policy toward China receives something less than its due—though what its due is may be a matter for legitimate differences of opinion—yet it is difficult to quarrel with his conclusions: that it would be wrong to exaggerate the disagreements and a blunder to expect a disruption of the alliance, but that the Soviet Union will never accept China as a great power on an equal footing with itself. On disarmament the book says almost nothing, except the well-worn (and true) statement that the arms race is the reflection and not the cause of political conflict. There is no analysis of the succession of Soviet proposals and positions in the long series of negotiations on disarmament or of how they fit into general Soviet strategy. But to cavil at an author for what he did not write is one of the easiest and, when we have at hand a 500-page book full of solid fare, least justified forms of criticism.

The author's general conclusion is worth citing here because his whole life work, and not this book alone, gives great weight to his views. He finds that Khrushchev, having failed in his attempt to line up the neutrals and the new nations in a common front with the "socialist camp" against the West, has been reduced to a policy of threats and intimidations based largely on the formidable growth

of Soviet military power over the last few years. He foresees the frustration of Soviet expansionism as a result of two developments the Kremlin cannot avoid: in the West, the re-emergence of the power of Western Europe, which will in turn give new impetus to the movement for the emancipation of Eastern Europe; and in Asia, the growth of the imperial designs of another Communist state. "Empires of the magnitude of Stalin's Russia are passing phenomena in world history; they are bound to fall." Unfortunately, the course of events over the years since Stalin's death, even if given the rather optimistic interpretation Mr. Dallin provides in this book, leaves some question whether those inexorable laws of historical development will prevail over the "scientific" laws which are part of the faith of Khrushchev, and presumably of his successors, in the inevitable victory of Communism.

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SALISBURY, HARRISON. *To Moscow and Beyond*. New York, Harper, 1960, 301 pp. \$4.95.

This is an ambivalent book, excellent in its reporting, immature and highly debatable in many of its recommendations as to American policy *vis-a-vis* the Communist world. Mr. Salisbury's credentials as a working correspondent in postwar Moscow are second to none. An earlier work, *American in Russia*, represented the distilled essence of five years of observation of the Soviet Union under Stalin for the *New York*

Times at the height of the cold war.

Returning to Russia in 1959 after a lapse of years, he was able to pick up the threads of the story, to note what had changed and what had not changed following the death of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev. He discusses likely successors to Khrushchev, changes in Soviet education, the background of the vicious campaign against Boris Pasternak, the nature and forms of expression of Soviet anti-Semitism and many other aspects of the Soviet scene.

One may doubt whether either of Mr. Salisbury's favored candidates, Mikoyan and Kirichenko, will step into Khrushchev's present position when Khrushchev goes the way of Stalin. Kirichenko has been sharply demoted since the book was published. It is doubtful whether Mikoyan, although he is certainly shrewd and experienced, possesses the brute strength required for a Soviet dictator. And he suffers under the disadvantage of belonging to an ethnic minority, the Armenians. The chances are that Stalin will be the last non-Russian autocrat of all the Soviet Republics.

One of the best pieces of reporting in the book is the account of the plight of the Jews in the Soviet Union. Here one finds abundant proof that the Soviet Union is the most anti-Jewish country in the world, apart from the Arab states, which have their special feud with Israel. In Stalin's last years there was crass, stark terror, with executions, banishments and "disappearances" of many Jews, prominent and obscure, and with Soviet newspapers full of venomous attacks against

"homeless cosmopolitans," who always had Jewish names. Salisbury knows of one case in which a Jewish family was shipped to Siberia merely because the ten-year-old daughter inquired in school where Israel is located.

There has been an alleviation of these extremes of persecution, along with a general relaxation of Stalin's almost paranoid terror. But Jews still suffer from a long list of disabilities: exclusion from the diplomatic service and officers' schools, discrimination in the universities, requirement to carry a passport with the word *evei* (Jew) inscribed on it.

Salisbury is one of the few foreign journalists who succeeded in entering Outer Mongolia, a Soviet dependency large in size, sparse in population, which occupies a buffer position between the Soviet Union and Red China. Although he was kept under close surveillance (it was difficult for him even to get a permit to visit the Soviet Embassy), he noticed the presence of a considerable number of Chinese workers and technicians who were working on new industrial plants and who could opt for Mongolian citizenship. He brought away this impression:

"Some (Mongols) leaned to Russia, some to China. And some, it was quite apparent, hoped that out of the new great power rivalry might emerge a new and greater Mongolia. It was much too early to forecast how this complicated situation might evolve. But there was every sign that the Russians were losing ground to the Chinese."

Salisbury is at his best as a straight reporter, at his worst as an amateur diplomatic adviser. He

takes an unwarrantedly optimistic view of Khrushchev's benevolent intentions toward the West. He almost sees the United States and the Soviet Union as allies against Red China—a vision which is premature, to say the least. He believes America's forward bases around the world would be annihilated by one push of a Soviet button—an extreme view which few military authorities would endorse. He is all out for United States recognition of Red China—without apparently giving a thought to the demoralizing effect which such a move would have on the Oriental states which are friendly to the United States.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
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LICHTHEIM, GEORGE. *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study*. New York, Praeger, 1961. 412 pp. \$8.50.

The subject of Marxism has almost been done to death by the plethora of recent American and European studies of it. Nevertheless George Lichtheim's fresh and rewarding (though difficult) treatise entirely justifies itself and points the way to much more work that is yet to be done in understanding Marx's meaning and the meaning the Communists have made out of it.

Mr. Lichtheim's unique contribution is a developmental view of the thought of Marx and his followers, in which the various static interpretations of his activism or fatalism, his revolutionism or humanism, find their places in a time sequence. Marx became a Marxist, in Lichtheim's view, with

a grandiose vision of revolutionary synthesis in 1844-45, which combined Hegel's sense of the logical historical process, the goals of French socialism, the analyses of English economics, and the mission of the proletariat as the active maker of history. Here there was no deterministic fatalism, but rather the conscious struggle by the class that realized its mission to transform philosophic ideals into social change.

The more familiar deterministic historical materialism took shape only gradually. For years Marx looked to one social force after another as the bearers of his philosophy—French workers, German democratic nationalists, Lassalleans, English workers, the Paris Commune—and was disappointed by all of them. Meanwhile his economic analysis of capitalist society, mainly in England, was taking shape. From this Marx drew more and more deterministic conclusions about the inevitable passage from capitalism to socialism (though he never intended this to apply anywhere but Western Europe and North America). In this manner Marx found the guarantee of the realization of his ethical ideal less in conscious revolutionary action and more in impersonal social trends. It is clear that Marx, like practically all his followers, did not become revolutionary because of his radical social analysis, but embraced the social analysis to buttress his ethical commitment to revolution.

It remained for Engels, Lichtheim maintains, to develop Marx's thinking into a rigorously deterministic science of society and nature, which he put forth in the *Anti-Duhring*, the *Dialectics of*

Nature, and various writings after Marx's death. This was the classical Marxism as it has been understood by almost everyone ever since, a "science of causal evolution." As such, it proved to be perfectly compatible with the non-revolutionary politics of the mass movement which the Marxists had finally succeeded in building—the German Social-Democratic Party.

The great break in the history of the Marxist movement came with its spread to Eastern Europe and particularly Russia, where, as Lichtheim notes, political conditions pointed toward a revolutionary situation like 1848 rather than the Western democratic movement. The Russian Marxists, all factions of them, were accordingly attracted to the revolutionary activism of the early Marx. Lenin went further, by drawing on the conspiratorial tradition of the Russian revolutionary movement, and arrived at his doctrine of the party—a force which would inject consciousness into the workers, mobilize the peasants and any other malcontents, and carry out both the "bourgeois" and "proletarian" revolutions, because the bourgeoisie was too weak in a country as backward as Russia.

Once in power, Lenin (and after him Stalin) began to spell out the totalitarian implications of the revolutionary seizure of power in a backward country. Their Marxist doctrine became a rigid official "ideology" in the Marxian sense of "false consciousness." "The custodians of this doctrine cannot afford a genuine confrontation with rival modes of thought," Lichtheim writes, "for the internal consistency of their viewpoint depends upon the ability to ma-

nipulate certain key concepts in such a manner as to exclude the semblance of discord between theory and practice." The Communists are incapable of any serious application of the Marxian critical method, since this would immediately expose both their ideological pretensions and their practical failings. Communism represents a new post-bourgeois class state which tries to deny any class analysis of itself. The only change Lichtheim sees in prospect is a withering of the ideology; he expects the abandonment of class terminology for class society, and this in fact has been borne out in the new Soviet party program. Real Marxism, apart from the Communist travesty, is intellectual history that cannot be brought back to life.

ROBERT V. DANIELS
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MONAS, SIDNEY. *The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961. 354 pp. \$6.75.

History furnishes few examples of autocrats who have ruled successfully without strong means for compelling acceptance of their authority. In the critical months following Russia's Decembrist conspiracy of 1825, the government, bent on preserving and strengthening autocracy at whatever cost, moved swiftly to introduce measures and machinery that would vigorously uphold the law, avert revolutionary activity, and elevate the moral character of the Russian people. Toward this end, the activities of "His Imperial Majesty's

Own Chancellery" were expanded and many of its functions delegated to sections or departments which assumed the importance of ministries. Thus, during the reign of Nicholas I some six sections of the imperial chancellery were created, of which the third, dealing with police matters, exercised extraordinary power. It is with the latter that Sidney Monas' *The Third Section* is concerned.

A good many misapprehensions have surrounded the creation and operation of the Third Section. Detailed information on the subject has been fragmentary and obscure. As demonstrated by Monas, the Third Section was entrusted in 1826 with two irreconcilable tasks: (1) to provide a broader basis of public support for the autocracy, and (2) to maintain all political initiative in the hands of the Tsar. Compared with other branches of the imperial administration the Third Section performed its function with relative efficiency and devotion. But the nature of its work under the leadership of Alexander Benckendorff and his associates caused it to become a repressive organization of gendarmes, who scrutinized the activities of public officials, reported on their shortcomings, uncovered political disaffection, and clumsily attempted to serve as "the moral physician of the people."

Monas has skillfully told the story of Nicholas' political police in a series of scenes that recapture much of the sight and sound of the period. Without access to Soviet archives, he has constructed his account from voluminous and fragmentary published sources. His portrayals of the leading personalities in the Third Section are un-

usually discerning and his comments on the Tsar and the somnolent Russian Empire illuminating. Benckendorff, the head of the Third Section, emerges as a loyal but ineffectual defender of the status quo, absent-minded and lamentably colorless. The director of the Third Section's chancery, von Vock, is by comparison a vigorous man who "concerned himself with everything, although everything did not necessarily yield to his concerns." The gendarme chief of staff, Dubelt, is a more intelligent figure but a tyrannical "personification of Nicholas' political police."

The author has supported his observations with strong evidence from a variety of sources. The reader cannot easily quarrel with his thesis that the Third Section, despite the effort to give it an air of nobility and moral responsibility, was in reality a repressive organization which failed to create the broader base of public support for the autocracy that was intended and only widened the gap between the sovereign and the Russian people. One or two minor complaints about the book might be registered. The author is inclined, at times, to oversupply the reader with quotations and biographical data which detract from the readability of his work. He also has a tendency to downgrade the writings of many reputable earlier historians whose research he nevertheless cites or utilizes. But on the whole Monas' book is a well-written monograph. Works on Russian administrative agencies of the nineteenth century are all too rare and those on police activities and censorship have until now been virtually non-existent in

English. *The Third Section* is, therefore, a valuable addition to the history of this period.

C. B. O'BRIEN

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ROMANOVSKY-KRASSINSKY, PRINCESS
M. F., *Dancing in Petersburg*.
Translated from the French
"Souvenirs de la Kschessinska".
Intr. by Arnold Haskell. Illustrated.
New York, Doubleday, 1961.
272 pp. \$4.50.

The memoirs of Kshesinskaya, one of the most famous and remarkable Russian ballerinas at the turn of the century, fall into two parts, one relating purely to ballet, the other to her private life, in particular the love affair of her early youth, which was known to all Russia. It is not too much to say that the curiosity aroused by Kshesinskaya's book centers mainly around this affair. The facts concerning it have not previously been published, and could not be published before the Revolution.

Kshesinskaya was the first love of Nicholas II at the time when he was still heir to the throne. After this she became intimately involved with two Grand Dukes, and after the Revolution she married one of them, Andrei Vladimirovich, the late Tsar's cousin. Grand Duke Cyril, head of the house of Romanovs, at this time conferred on her the title she still retains. Although these facts are probably not new to most Russian readers, they are unlikely to be known by those in America, England or France, especially those unfamiliar with the world of ballet. The most they will know of Kshesinskaya is that she owned

the house which has become part of the history of the Revolution because Lenin delivered his fiery Bolshevik speeches from its balcony on those summer evenings of 1917.

Kshesinskaya described her love affair with the heir to the Russian throne in detail, but with great tact and restraint. Her innate sense of delicacy told her that it was still too soon after the tragic death of Nicholas II to recount everything, including details which would be painful to those of his contemporaries who were still alive. But much of her account is colorful and lively, as for instance her recollections of the final ballet examination at which Alexander III singled her out among the youthful dancers, saying, "May you be the pride and glory of our ballet!"

Kshesinskaya fulfilled the Tsar's wish, and her success owed nothing to her connections with the court. This should be emphasized most strongly, in order to dispel the myth that her outstandingly successful career was due to her privileged position in the ballet company of the Mariinsky Theatre. It was Kshesinskaya who eclipsed the Italian ballerinas, until then the leading dancers in St. Petersburg, and she who made it unnecessary for them to be invited to Russia. When, in the Mariinsky Theatre, she became the first Russian dancer to execute thirty-two "fouettés"—then considered the hardest of technical feats—she was acclaimed with "national rejoicing," in the words of Arnold Haskell, the famous English historian of ballet. Those were untroubled times, and Haskell's words are not far from the truth.

Unfortunately, in the account of her artistic life Kshesinskaya restricts herself in the main to listing her successes and triumphs over the years, and pays little attention to ballet as an art. It would have been most valuable if she had given us, for example, a general picture of the people she worked with, especially Pavlova, Karsavina, Nijinsky or Vladimirov, and had expressed her opinion of modern choreography.

The most interesting pages of her memoirs are those in which she tells of her ordeals and setbacks in the first years of the Revolution, how her house was seized, how she fled from Petrograd, and how she managed to leave her native land, where her very life was in danger. Of the numerous photographs in the book perhaps the most moving are those taken in her declining years at the ballet school in Paris, which she still directs. These are a living reminder of the glory that was ballet and of a brilliant, luxurious, carefree world which has vanished forever.

GEORGE ADAMOVITCH
University of Manchester

TURGENEV'S LETTERS. A Selection
Edited and Translated from the
Russian, French and German
Originals by Edgar H. Lehrman.
New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
1961. 438 pp. \$5.00.

In evaluating any sort of selection, it is important to learn what criteria were employed in making the selection. On p. XXII ("A Note to Scholars"), the editor of the present volume states his purposes: "One of my aims has been to shed light on works Tur-

genev himself wrote . . ." This is the most important and legitimate of the aims, although it is obvious that the opinion of an author about his own work carries no greater weight, objectively, than the opinion of a critic; frequently not as great. However, when the author in question is a person of the stature of Turgenev, his opinion—whether of his own or any one else's work—becomes a major literary event.

For that reason, the publication in English of the complete letters of Turgenev is long overdue. Whether, as Tolstoy stated, the chief virtue of Turgenev is his "truthfulness" ("sincerity" would probably be more appropriate), the fact is that Turgenev's opinions cannot be ignored even though, on occasion, they may be questioned. There are valuable and illuminating sidelights in the present selection on Turgenev's attitude toward the heroes of his novels, specifically Bazarov from *Fathers and Sons*. The letters are arranged chronologically, and represent as good a sample of the total heritage as could be arranged by any one individual. Appendices supply additional material for the elucidation of certain allusions in the text of the letters which would remain unintelligible otherwise. A very valuable—almost 30-page long—section, "Sources of Letters," is provided toward the end of the book. There is also a limited bibliography and a reference to a more nearly complete bibliography of Turgenev's letters. The translation leaves much to be desired. One of many lapses, for example, is in Appendix D, on p. 365, where the translator has obviously confused two Russian

words—"vily"—pitchfork, and "vila"—table fork.

Some of the items on the debit side may be cited at random; a somewhat puzzling caption is supplied to the frontispiece portrait of Turgenev: "Turgenev. Painting, 1884. The Bettman Archive." Considering that Turgenev died in 1883, the only comment possible here is—"He certainly is well preserved." Although Mr. Lehrman states ("Note to Scholars," p. XX) that "family names have invariably been given in nominative, masculine form," yet in the "Preface," on p. XVII, Princess Khilkov (or Khilkova, if the feminine form be employed) is translated as "Princess Khilkovoi"—an obvious mistaking of the dative case for the nominative. On the same page, "St. Egor's Day" should, of course, be St. George's Day, since all three Russian forms—Georgii, Yurii, and Egor—are translated into English as George. To call Dostoevsky (in opposition to the liberal Turgenev) "more Orthodox than the Tzar" would require an explanation as to *when* that difference would be most actual. Dostoevsky had different outlooks at different times in his life, specifically before and after his Siberian hard labor and exile. The use of the word Orthodox (and capitalized, to boot) in opposing it to "liberal" is unfortunate since it may easily be confused with religious Orthodoxy ("pravoslavie"). What was obviously meant here was "more conservative"—or, even, "more reactionary"—than the Tzar. The reference to Turgenev's play *A Month in the Country* as "pre-Chekhovian" is true only in a chronological sense; in that case, every play written before Che-

khov's time is pre-Chekhovian. With the same logic and lack of point, Chekhov's plays may be called "post-Turgenev." On p. XVIII, in the Preface, we read: "The nature of the sexual relations between Turgenev and Mme. Viardot has been the matter of endless speculation . . ." It is almost certain that the author of the Preface does not mean what that sentence implies. What has been the matter of speculation was the nature of relations—whether carnal or platonic—between Mme. Viardot-Garcia and Turgenev, and the specific method of sexual gratification presumably employed by them (at which the sentence in the Preface points) could be of no particular interest to any one except the possible participants. In general, the Preface is too sketchy, somewhat primitive, and rather unexpected in the judgments rendered. One gets an impression as if one were reading a student term paper transcribed from too brief and none-too-accurate lecture notes.

The task of translating, editing, and publishing Turgenev's letters is an extremely important one, and it is still largely to be done, even if one were to consider the present volume as a beginning. It is sincerely to be hoped that it will be continued and completed, even if some help from the proper foundations is found to be necessary. This task should be placed in the hands of a committee of competent scholars who would have the time and inclination to participate in the work of preparing and editing the material. This would assure the future publication of being a really significant undertaking worthy of their time and effort. In the meantime, thanks are due to Mr. Lehr-

man for serving as a pioneer in this noble venture.

JACK A. POSIN
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FREEBORN, RICHARD. *Turgenev: The Novelist's Novelist. A Study.* London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 201 pp. 21s.

As the title implies, this book proposes to explain the special quality of Turgenev's art, "to illuminate," in the author's words, "the distinctive features of what is referred to as the 'Turgenevan novel,'" to show what it was that Henry James meant when he called Turgenev "the Novelist's Novelist" and "the Beautiful Genius." The aim is admirable, the author's interest in his subject is manifestly serious and sincere; but, unfortunately, his critical equipment is not equal to the difficult task he has set himself. In his eagerness to arrive at unmistakable definitions, at unambiguous conclusions, Dr. Freeborn forces his analysis into a kind of primitive orderliness, ties the ends of his arguments in tidy but unnatural knots, and, in short, so constricts and over-simplifies his complex subject that all its exquisiteness and subtlety evaporate. The main section of the book, "Four Great Novels," is devoted to an analysis of *Rudin*, *A Nest of the Gentry*, *On the Eve*, and *Fathers and Children*, each of which is discussed under four separate headings: "Structure," "Ideas and Ideals," "Hero and Heroine," "The Achievement"—an awkward scheme that makes a unified view of the novels impossible and seems to be a practice piece, an elemen-

tary exercise, in criticism rather than a finished product. This main section is preceded by four brief chapters, which sketch Turgenev's social and family background, his education, and his early work; and it is followed by three others: one on *Smoke* ("The Novel as Political Pamphlet"), one on *Virgin Soil* ("The Failure of *Virgin Soil*") and a summary ("The Novelist's Novelist: The Beautiful Genius"). There appears to be a basic flaw in method and approach.

On the other hand, Dr. Freeborn's study has distinct merits. His original translations from the Russian are idiomatic, his summaries of plots, compact and clear, and certain of his comments are well worth noting. Such are the discussions of how Turgenev's novels evolved from the short story and of the "theatrical" elements in their construction: the given setting, the introduction of the protagonist, the episodic nature of the story—as if the whole were enacted on a stage. Such too is the analysis of what Dr. Freeborn calls Turgenev's "sympathetic detachment," an objective but not indifferent attitude, which, modelled on Pushkin's, is a distinguishing mark of Turgenev's realism. And such are several perceptive passages about Turgenev's portraiture: an incisive characterization of Liza in *A Nest of the Gentry*, for example; a penetrating remark about Bazarov, to the effect that his was "the dilemma of the man who, though he may know his human insignificance, can still feel his own self-importance"; or the observation that the degree to which this hero of *Fathers and Children* is alienated from his society is shown in successive stages

in the settings in which he is placed, each of which displays his isolation in a new light.

But one tends to lose sight of such excellent insights as these in a context of naive assumptions and false emphases. Thus, although it is unquestionably true that Turgenev was always preoccupied with the contrast between the egoist and the altruist, between Hamlet and Don Quixote, to say that in order to create Bazarov, "he had only to combine the resolute characteristics discernible in his portrait of Elena (in *On the Eve*) with the intellectual interest of such a figure as Rudin" is to conceive of a great artist's creative processes in terms of games or riddles. And to assert that Turgenev nurtured "the idea that man can only fulfil himself by uniting in himself these twin poles of human nature" (i.e., Hamlet and Don Quixote) is to reduce his thought to the kind of formula-making which is altogether inconsistent with his highly particularized, individualistic art. Again, Turgenev's melancholy is well known, but to explain it as based on a conviction that happiness is a form of *hubris*, of "fire accidentally stolen from the gods," and to suggest that, therefore, his momentarily happy characters prefigure Dostoevsky's God-strugglers is, surely, to misinterpret his thought, his temper, and the nature of his writing.

And so it goes. Dr. Freeborn ascribes both too much and too little to Turgenev's achievement. In his eyes it was Turgenev who was the virtual creator of the great Russian novel of the nineteenth century, so that without him Tolstoy and Dostoevsky could not

have done what they did—a remarkably exaggerated, untenable claim. But to sum up Turgenev's work as "a mirror of man's conscience," as "beautiful because it makes us aware of beauty," as a balance "between love and death, joy and sadness, youth and age, innocence and maturity" is insufficient, though very fine. For of what great novelist could it not be said that his work was "a mirror of man's conscience," or that he effected, in one way or another, a harmony between love and death, joy and sadness, youth and age, or that his love stories were, as Dr. Freeborn points out elsewhere, a revelation of his heroes and heroines? One must conclude that however sensible and honest this book may be, there is much in it that is distorted and inadequate. Its approach is artificial, its analyses mechanical and not discriminating enough. Determined to get at the recipe of Turgenev's rare wine, Dr. Freeborn has looked into its origins: the soil, the grapes, even the process of fermentation, but, with all his appreciation of it, he has not known how to discover its secret, nor has he succeeded in conveying the unique flavor of its delicate bouquet.

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

ZOSHCHENKO, MIKHAIL. *Izbrannoe*. (Introduction and edited by Marc Slonim.) Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1960. 346 pp. \$6.00.

In bringing out this new edition of Zoshchenko's stories beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, the University of Michigan Press

had an excellent opportunity to make available to Russian readers and students of the Russian language and Soviet literature some of the superb humorist's best stories in their original, unexpurgated versions. (It should be pointed out that these versions are for the most part available in the United States in editions published in the Soviet Union during the 'twenties, the period of the New Economic Policy, when Communist Party literary controls were the least stringent and when Zoshchenko's popularity was greatest.) Unfortunately, the University of Michigan Press for all its good intentions failed in the task it set for itself. It did so by falling into the trap it had intended to avoid.

Firstly, the Michigan Zoshchenko is to a great extent based on the Soviet edition of 1958. Of its 59 stories, some 31 are taken from the Soviet publication of 1958. Secondly, the editors of the Michigan edition seem to have been unaware of the publication in 1956, two years before Zoshchenko's death and not after. Mr. Slonim points out in his introduction that a good half of the stories in the 1958 Soviet edition were innocuous, "well-intended" works such as stories about Lenin and Kerensky. In planning its own edition to present "a true and unadulterated image of the great humorist," the University of Michigan Press therefore omitted stories it considered written to satisfy Party demands and substituted other stories drawn from earlier Zoshchenko editions. It is regrettable that all the stories in the Michigan publication were not copied from earlier editions, for despite the expressed awareness of

deficiencies of the 1958 Soviet edition (the emphasis on stories written under Party pressure), there was no consideration of the many unacknowledged textual emendations in the stories printed in this edition. In accepting more than half of the stories in this edition, the University of Michigan Press was printing not the original, unexpurgated versions of Zoshchenko's stories but purged versions sanctioned by the Party's literary authorities.

The Michigan edition perpetuates many distortions of the real Zoshchenko made by zealous Party censors. The last unchanged edition of Zoshchenko's collected works was printed in 1946, before Zhdanov denounced him. For the next decade, Zoshchenko's works were not printed. When they appeared again in 1956, 1958, and 1960, the texts revealed considerable emendations even though the original dates of publication were given. The editors offered no reason for the changes. But the reason is obvious in the light of the criticism levelled against Zoshchenko from the time of the Zhdanov

speech. The changes serve to create the impression that Zoshchenko is attacking vestiges of the old imperial regime rather than the shortcomings of the new Soviet state. The omissions or substitutions of curses in which the original versions abound were made only in those parts of the story in which the narrator, i.e., an average Soviet citizen, is speaking. In this way his language becomes that of a simple, everyday person, but "pure." The quoted speech, the language of the characters, purposely remains unchanged, however. In the official Soviet attitude the narrator, although still uneducated, is a conscientious, straightforward person, a representative of the simple but good people of the Soviet Union, while the other characters, the "demagnetized petty bourgeois," are elements alien to the new Soviet society. Therefore, in its reliance on the Soviet edition of 1958 the University of Michigan Press has brought the reader not much nearer the real Zoshchenko.

VERA R. VON WIREN
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Book Notices

BEREDAY, GEORGE Z. F. and PENNAR, JAAN (Editors), *The Politics of Soviet Education*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 217 pp.

The eleven short essays which make up this book represent part of the contributions made to a seminar on Soviet education, organized by Dr. Pennar and held in Munich, Germany under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of the U. S. S. R. Two of the essays were contributed by scholars educated in the Soviet Union, two by Western Europeans, and the remaining seven by American specialists in Soviet affairs. The essays necessarily are brief, for limitations of space preclude detailed analytical treatment of the subject matter. In spite of this, the book attains its objective. There is not one of the essays which does not document, in some fashion, the impact of the Soviet regime upon the educational apparatus.

As is so often the case in a book of this type, the essays are uneven in quality. While some essays are of great worth, others seem relatively unimportant. The first essay by Karca is a rather pedestrian "General View of Soviet Education." Rapacz's essay on the Khrushchev educational reform is quite thorough, and, in addition to factual detail, contributes some excellent analyses of this reform. The most satisfying essays in the book are those contributed by

Bereday, Pennar, and Burg.

Bereday's essay on "Class Tensions" is a noteworthy effort which documents very thoroughly, within the space available, the contributions made by education to the growing inequalities and stratifications within the Soviet system. Dr. Pennar illustrates the various types of political controls very well and traces their development. Mr. Burg's essay on "Foreign Language Teaching" demonstrates dramatically that the Soviet Union has not achieved the eminence of language study which some experts have claimed for it. Save for a very few excellent schools, about which the Soviet press rarely comments, much of the language teaching is unsatisfactory. One Soviet writer is quoted as follows: ". . . Most graduates lack sufficient mastery of a foreign language to enable them either to read any foreign literature or to undertake personal oral or written contact with foreigners without the assistance of an interpreter." Burg also notes the obvious danger to the Soviet rulers if too many Soviet citizens should attain proficiency in foreign languages.

Mr. Dodge's essay on "Teacher Preparation," Dr. Medlin's "Teaching of History," and "Extracurricular Activities" by Irene Mareuil all merit the careful attention of American teachers and educators. To those who believe that there has been a lessening of anti-religious activity under Mr. Khrushchev's regime, the essay of

Father Floridi will be of great benefit. Dr. Field's essay is rather a disappointment as a conclusion to the book.

A fuller treatment of the training of Soviet scientists (ample materials from Soviet sources are available on this subject) would have been welcome. However, the book makes a genuine contribution to our knowledge of Soviet education.

KENNETH I. DAILEY

Syracuse University

An Anthology of Russian Literature in the Soviet Period from Gorki to Pasternak. Edited, translated, and annotated by Bernard Guilbert Guerney. New York, Modern Library Paperbacks, 1960. 452 pp. \$1.45.

Over the past few years paperback editions have rendered a great service to the field of Russian literature by making worth-while works available to American readers of average means.

Guerney's latest anthology may be placed in this category. In a 15-page preface he gives a bird's-eye sketch of the history of Soviet literature, and then presents the body of the anthology.

The volume comprises selections of poetry as well as prose. The poetry selections include verses taken from Blok, Mayakovsky, Esenin, and Pasternak. No other Soviet poet is represented. The prose includes titles by Gorki, A. Tolstoy, Babel, Fadeev, Zamyatin (*We*), Kataev, and others.

The translations for the most part read smoothly and occasionally come up with an especially apt phrase.

My greatest objection lies with Guerney's attempt to render Russian colloquialisms into idiomatic American. The admittedly difficult task does not always come off well. The translator is too prone to mix a grand, almost early Victorian, style with his Americanisms and cockneyisms. The juxtaposition creates a bizarre style, which may not be inappropriate for some of the "ornamentalists" but which seems questionable for all writers included in the anthology.

Also disturbing is the lack of system in Guerney's transliteration of Russian names. Thus we have Michael Michaelovich Zoshchenko—alongside Evgenii (rather than Eugene) Zamyatin. The rendition of the Russian *f* of Afanasy-Afonka (its diminutive) on the one hand by *th* in "Athanassy" and then just two lines below by *ph* (!!!) (Aphonka, page 59), sounds both ludicrous and pretentious.

Other sources of wonderment include Guerney's raptures over the mangled Russian of some of his Odessa ladies, and such occasional startling bits of "information" as that A. N. Tolstoy was a "direct descendant" of Ivan Turgenev (Page 43).

Nonetheless, despite such points of irritation, Guerney's anthology provides worth-while reading and in all fairness should be judged as a contribution to the growing stock of translations from the Russian.

OLEG A. MASLENIKOV

University of California
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JACOBS, DAN N. (Ed.) *The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents*. Evanston, Ill.,

Row, Peterson & Co., 1961. 218 pp. \$1.90.

In this handy little compendium Professor Dan Jacobs of Miami University has brought together the full texts of some of the most important recent doctrinal pronouncements of international Communism. The title document is the Moscow declaration of eighty-one Communist Parties of December, 1960, in which the differences between China and Russia were supposedly patched up. Professor Jacobs contributes several pages of his own on the background of the 1960 conference and the reasons why the Sino-Soviet disagreement is not likely to disappear. (It is not made clear that the title, "The New Communist Manifesto," was a foreign journalistic appellation and not the official name of the declaration.)

The "related documents" (each with an introductory note) start with the original Communist Manifesto of 1848. The point of including this without any of the other landmarks in the history of Marxism-Leninism is unclear; by itself it exaggerates the parallel significance attributed to the "New Manifesto." More pertinent is the background of post-Stalin reform represented by Khrushchev's secret speech of February, 1956 (to which Lenin's "Testament" is appended), and Mao Tse-tung's "Hundred Flowers" speech of February 1957. The Moscow declaration of twelve Communist Parties in November 1957 restores the tone of international Communist unity and discipline. Finally, the Yugoslav reaction to Chinese and Soviet denunciations of "revisionism" is represented by excerpts

from Edvard Kardelj's critique of Chinese bellicosity, "Socialism and War."

ROBERT V. DANIELS

The University of Vermont

KOVALEVSKY, SONYA. *Erinnerungen aus meiner Kindheit* (Memoirs of my Childhood). Weimar, Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1961. 220 pp. D. M. 5.30.

Though written originally in Russian, these fascinating memoirs of one of the world's greatest woman mathematicians were first published in the Swedish language and have now come out in a German series which also includes Tatyana Kuszmanskaya's *Anisya's Fate*.

Sonya Kovalevsky's book affords insight into the life and problems of a highly alert and ambitious young Russian girl, who spent her girlhood in the 'sixties and 'seventies, who strove to break out of the confines of her over-protected environment, and eventually escaped by way of a mock marriage, which enabled her to pursue an intellectual career in Heidelberg, Berlin, and Paris. Settling down in Sweden, where Ellen Key was fighting for the equality of women, Sonya Kovalevsky gained the position of the first woman professor at any university. In recognition of her contributions in the field of mathematics she was awarded the Prix Bordin by the French Academy of Science for her outstanding work in differential calculus and on the "problem of rotation." She moved in a circle which included the most illustrious scientists of her day, such as Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, and

her Russian compatriots Dr. Bodkin, Peter Lavrov, and the famous psychiatrist Pavel Ivanovich Jacoby.

The highlight of this vividly written book is Sonya Kovalevsky's account of Dostoevsky, whom she secretly loved when she was just thirteen while he was desperately trying to find favor in the critical eyes of her older sister Anuta, half a year before he met his second wife Anna Grigorievna. She describes Dostoevsky's daily visits to their house in Moscow, his physical appearance at the age of forty-three, his ever-changing moods, their exciting discussions about plans for his future books, his jealous possessiveness during social gatherings, and his unpredictable behavior. Much has been written about Dostoevsky by his second wife and by others who knew him well. The special charm and novelty of Sonya Kovalevsky's spirited account stems from the fact that she viewed him with the keenly observant eyes of a precocious girl who noticed traits and nuances that often eluded the attention of her elders.

The memoirs are greatly enhanced by the excellent editorial work of Noa Kiepenheuer and Friedrich Minckwitz, and by a fine and informative epilogue by Leo Hartmann. It is to be hoped that this valuable book will also become available to the English reading public before long.

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OVERSTREET, HARRY AND BONARO.
The War Called Peace. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1961. 368 pp. \$4.50.

The War Called Peace, like the Overstreets' first book on Communism, was written for the non-specialist. It is soundly based, clearly written, and very readable.

The authors have a growing conviction that ". . . the free world today faces an issue of moral and spiritual survival it has never faced before. *Communist man confronts the free man.*" [Their italics.] And they continue, "We have Khrushchev to thank for this growing conviction. . . . This book is an attempt to explore what Khrushchev reveals." The exploration examines Khrushchev's (and Communism's) plans, weapons, and areas of conflict. The findings will be familiar to all who have studied Communist words and deeds, or even to those who have carefully followed the daily news, but it is useful to have the matter clearly and succinctly re-stated in convenient form.

One of the most valuable parts of the book is the section in which the Overstreets discuss the five "self-indulgences" by which ". . . we could hand over to Khrushchev in his lifetime the makings of victory." The five are: (1) self-indulgent pessimism which encourages the free world to make repeated concessions on the ground that "Communism is here to stay"; (2) self-indulgent optimism which insists that growing industrialization will automatically make the Communists liberal; (3) self-indulgent sentimentality which would leave "the whole free world at the mercy of Communism" by accepting unilateral disarmament by the free world; (4) self-indulgent indifference to human needs and aspirations, thus leaving the field open to the Communists; and (5) the self-

indulgence of boredom which means the turning away from an unsolved problem simply because we are tired of hearing about it.

The War Called Peace deserves wide readership. It is eminently suitable for school and college courses, as well as for study groups and individual readers.

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TOMASIC, D. A. *National Communism and Soviet Strategy*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 222 pp. \$4.50.

The central theme of Professor Tomasic's book is the history of the Communist movement in Yugoslavia, from its early beginnings up to 1956. Step by step, the author unfolds the complicated sequence of metamorphoses: the heroic period which almost succeeded in making Yugoslavia a Communist state as early as 1919; a period of anabiosis (especially from 1929 to 1934 when the Party was outlawed); a period of slow growth interrupted by factional feuds; a second heroic period characterized by the activities of the Partisans during the second World War; the swift mutation from constitutional monarchy to Communist dictatorship along the Lenin-Stalin lines; the break with Moscow (which, by the way, is only briefly treated); the weakening of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the exposure of the abuses of the Communist system, especially in the fields of government and economics; and, finally, the vigorous res-

toration of Communist power through retraction of temporary concessions and a return to the Leninist-Stalinist type of dictatorship—still free, however, from Moscow's tutelage.

In this study, the least known but most fascinating part deals with "Disintegrating Forces" (Chap. VIII of the book), i.e., the tremendous explosion of forces antagonistic to the Leninist-Stalinist Leviathan which made themselves felt as soon as some freedom of expression was granted. This part is based entirely on statements published in Serbian during 1954, and M. Djilas' name is often mentioned, although his famous *The New Class* was not yet published. This is perhaps the author's greatest contribution to the study of Communist society in general. By means of the Yugoslav example, the reader learns to understand the otherwise puzzling fluctuations of Communist societies (including the U. S. S. R. after Stalin's death) between periods of relative liberalism and periods of strict enforcement of ideological and, of course, political conformity.

It is regrettable that the treatment of national Communism in Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere is rather superficial and limited to only the last chapter of the book. Contrary to expectations aroused by the title, Soviet strategy shows up only as the background of events in Yugoslavia. But the short presentation is clear, vivid, and convincing, and may be of great help to those studying Communist society in general.

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